


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
Oswald Garrison Villard

President New York Evening Post Company

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Introduction



THE following articles, written for the *New York Evening Post*, are an effort to show, first, the lack of any necessity for the extensive military and naval programme urged by the President of the United States, and secondly, that, unless a radical reform and overhauling of the army take place before any increase is made, the tax-payer will have less assurance than ever that he will receive his money's worth in military efficiency. Creating an army means something more than adding men or guns. In the articles that follow, facts are given as to the conditions in the army and navy which every American ought to know before he makes up his mind as to whether we need to enlarge our armaments, and what is needed if the policy of army increase is determined upon. Since these articles were written, Congressman Kitchin has given his word to the public, as a member of the House Naval Committee of years' standing, that our navy is twice as effective as the Japanese, and considerably more effective than the German. In fact, he quotes three of the highest authorities, Admiral Fletcher, Rear-Admiral Badger, and Admiral Winterhalter, all of whom testify that they would not have any fear in pitting the American navy against the German. He has further testified that in his judgment, if this programme goes through, it will no longer be a question of wondering whether we may become a great militaristic and navalistic power, but of recognizing that we have become one. Surely this alone, from a man of Congressman Kitchin's high standing as leader of the Democrats in the House of Representatives, ought to give the nation pause—at least until the European war is over.

O. G. V.

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SPECIAL NOTICE

Additional copies of this pamphlet will be mailed for 10 cents each to any address. Quantity prices on application to The *New York Evening Post*, 20 Vesey Street, New York.

THE Question of Preparedness

PREPAREDNESS—FOR WHAT?

Shall We Reverse Our Historic Policy of a Small Army Without Reserves?—Need of Defining Terms—Why All This Sudden Hysteria?

—Enormous Difficulties of Invasion by Any Foreign Power

IT IS CONCEDED that a sudden burst of fear and anxiety as a result of the European war will probably induce the coming Congress, under Mr. Wilson's guidance, to reverse our historic policy of a small army without reserves and to provide a still larger fleet. If this is the possibility or probability, the taxpayers, who will have an enormous annual bill to pay, and the masses of our people generally, upon whose welfare the new departure will have such a far-reaching effect, should insist upon the laying down of certain national policies after the most careful debate and discussion, and above all upon the definition of many words and phrases relating to armament now so loosely used.

Many politicians are solemnly rising to assure us that they believe in "reasonable preparedness," a phrase that no one can define, certainly not to suit the advocates of large armies and navies any more than a "reasonable tariff" could be framed to suit both the protectionists whose pockets are lined by tariffs and the American people from whose pockets the dividends are drawn. Newspapers without number are also declaring that they favor "reasonable preparedness" without, however, the slightest effort to define these words for their readers. Some of them assure us that "reasonable preparedness" does not mean militarism, but if you offered them untold sums they could not draw for you the line which divides military preparedness from militarism. They do not know whether 250,000 regulars are one side of the line and 300,000 on the other; they cannot tell you if they would just when a military caste becomes a menace to a nation. They admit that it can be; they admit that in dealing with any militarism a nation handles the possible seeds of evil—our forefathers, who were familiar with British militarism, wished no inoculation of the virus no matter how diluted the dose.

They fall back, if hard pressed, upon the military experts, but here they are on still less stable ground because no dozen officers can be got to agree on any

given proposal, and if they could be made to agree, they would not "stay put" because they would steadily be adding to the number of our possible or potential enemies and to the strength of each of those enemies, precisely as the British naval officers have shifted their ground in the last sixty years. Thus the latter long held that they must have the largest navy in the world to defeat any other single navy. Then they decided upon the historic "two-power standard," that is, one large enough to defeat simultaneously the two navies next strongest. This was the accepted policy, but just prior to the present war proposals were seriously made in naval circles that there be a three-power standard in order to take care at one and the same time of the German, French, and United States navies, the menacing growth of the last-named being avowedly the reason for this fresh demand upon the wealth of the British people.

WHAT IS "REASONABLE PREPAREDNESS"?

If "reasonable preparedness" is to be defined, there must first be a decision on certain far-reaching national policies. Thus: [Are we to prepare merely for the defence of our shores or are we to adopt the military theory that often the best way to defend one's territory is to take the offensive and attack the other fellow upon his? This has been, as the present war has shown, the favorite theory of the German General Staff, which is still very proud of the fact that, barring Russian incursions into East Prussia, all the fighting has been on their enemies' territory in a war which every German is convinced is purely a defensive enterprise. If we are to pay the Germans the compliment of imitating them in this, as we are going to imitate them in many other ways] if Mr. Garrison's plans are adopted, it means that we must have a far larger armada than for purely home defensive purposes. We must have ocean-crossing submarines, we must have hospital ships, and endless other auxiliaries, such as mine-laying vessels, "mother" craft for submarines and hydroaero-

planes, floating machine-shops for repairs, floating docks to be towed abroad as the British have towed theirs to the Ægean, and colliers by the hundred. The 183 war-vessels Mr. Daniels calls for would by no means meet the need. For if we send a fleet to defeat the Germans and to blockade Germany, vast quantities of coal and oil must be transported from the United States and transferred at sea, for there will be no friendly shelter in which to provision or repair or coal, and ordinary merchant vessels cannot be equipped with coal-transferring apparatus over-night. All of these problems become more intensive if the objective is Japan; and the Philippines—a great source of military weakness—would probably help us not at all.

Again, the question of a two-power or a three-power navy at once obtrudes itself, if we decide upon an offensive fleet. Already naval officers declare the Panama Canal not the great help it was expected to be, but a source of weakness, since it makes easy the splitting of the fleet. And it has a habit of being blocked. They, therefore, demand a Pacific fleet as great as the Atlantic one, and they want it all the more since, as any one can see who wishes to dream dreams and speculate as to the future, a joint combination of Japan and Germany against us is quite within the range of possibility after the present hatreds have died out. Nothing is impossible in view of what has happened in Europe, they say, and, therefore, we ought to prepare against every possible contingency. Is not China likely to arm now against us and Japan? At any rate, should we be any the less forehanded than the British? The enthusiasts of the Navy League, who are demanding an immediate bond issue of \$500,000,000 to be spent on the navy alone, feel that we ought to arm against Great Britain, and have a navy larger than hers, no matter to what "power standard" she should go. They want, in their own words, a navy "capable of meeting any possible force from across the seas," i. e., a navy equal to that of

France, Germany, and England combined. And of course, if we are to arm against the British fleet, we must arm against Canada and fortify the boundary of whose defencelessness for a century we have been so proud.

Then there is the question of commerce—its destruction and protection. The United States, being practically a self-supporting nation, could behold with comparative equanimity all its merchant navy, none too large, blockaded in its own or neutral harbors. But naval officers do not like to contemplate this. Shall we not imitate the glorious careers of the Emden and the Karlsruhe? Is there any better way of protecting your own ships than by driving those of the other nations off the seas? Hence for our offensive navy we must at once create ocean-going submarines, with an enormous cruising radius, particularly as we have taken the first step in that direction by authorizing the "fleet-submarine."

THE SIMPLER PROBLEM.

If, on the other hand, it is decided never to contemplate anything beyond a defensive navy, the officers admit that the problem is immediately simplified. They confess that much cheaper and smaller submarines and more of them can be constructed; that the huge auxiliary flotilla could be largely eliminated and the monitor type of coast-defence vessel, like those built for the Brazilian navy, which the British have found most useful on the shallow Belgian coast, can be greatly developed. The problem of mine fields could then be studied in coöperation with our land coast-defence forces, and the latter taken into account in the development of any purely naval-defence problem, particularly as our coast defences are considered impregnable by our leading ordnance and coast-artillery officers. The value of coast defences would seem to have been amply demonstrated in this war; the coast defences in the Dardanelles and along the Belgian coast have quite held their own in the contest with the floating gun. The British have not been able to land troops on the Belgian coast, despite the efficiency of their monitors. The question, then, would seem to be whether we have not a large enough fleet to make up the deficiencies, if any, in our coast defences, provided that we adopt as a fixed national policy the theory that we shall not send them abroad to wage war under any conceivable circumstances.

There was a time, and not so very long ago, when our military experts were certain that we could protect our coasts without any navy at all. This was the belief of the Endicott Fortifications Board, which drew up the present plan of our coast defences in the days before we had any navy worth speaking of. They undertook to do this for a comparatively small sum. Since that time we have spent \$175,973,699.13, so that we ought to have something for our money.

WHY ALL THE HYSTERIA?

After the questions of policy are decided, would it not pay Congress and the American people to inquire calmly and quietly—and not in the stress of emotion of a world war—whether the present coast defences for which the builders vouch so unqualifiedly are not

enough in connection with a large fleet of submarines to let us sleep o' nights?

The question is the more pertinent because no writer who favors greater preparedness seems to have any faith whatever in our present navy. If I were a naval officer, I should be deeply humiliated by the fact that every one of the dozens upon dozens of articles that I have read which explain why it is necessary that we should have a mobile army with reserves of no less than 500,000 men to stand behind our coast defences and to prevent the enemy from landing at Atlantic City or Montauk Point begins by taking it for granted that the fleet will be overwhelmingly defeated. I have heard learned Admirals make after-dinner speeches which began with the assumption—or the admission, if you please—that in any engagement our fleet in its present numbers would be smashed and sunk. They seem to have no confidence in themselves or their vessels unless they are given a complete preponderance in numbers. They have no belief in the possibility of a superior skill and morale to offset smaller forces.

So the civilian writers, even in the days before it was popular to run down the navy and to accuse Secretary Daniels of every crime in the category, including all the sins of omission and commission of all his predecessors, have no doubts whatever as to what will happen to our fleet in any possible action. To them, forsooth, any battle spells defeat, overwhelming, disastrous, complete defeat. They do not leave us even half a dozen submarines after it with which to harass any hostile fleet and the enormous aggregation of hostile transports and auxiliaries which will be necessary for any elaborate expedition against our shores, particularly if it should be a joint military and naval one. In all our military arguments we start on the theory and assumption that the worst conceivable is bound to happen; our fleet to the last destroyer and submarine goes down, and the enemy then chooses in all deliberation certain points well known to the magazine writers on our next wars, and the disembarkation takes place without the slightest molestation.

ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES OF INVASION.

These writers are in no wise concerned with the fact that it is only with great difficulty that a landing of all the multifarious equipment of a modern army could take place anywhere without docks; that 42-centimetre guns, or even those considerably smaller, cannot be put ashore at Montauk without pontoons, lighters, cranes of great capacity, etc. One cannot land the modern field gun strapped across the bows of a couple of steam launches; but if one could, the process for a large army would be interminable. Certainly no foreign general in his senses would seek as his base a little harbor remote from a railroad which could not contain anything more than a fraction of the mighty armada an invading force must bring with it. Still less would he dream of landing on the open beach. It is true that Admiral Fletcher, when asked by a Congressional committee last winter whether an enemy could land on such a

shore as that between Norfolk and Port Royal, where there are no anchorages for deep-draught battleships or any other craft, and a surf which so often becomes impossible in stormy weather for the staunchest lifeboats, replied that such a landing could be made.

Unfortunately no Congressman asked Admiral Fletcher what would happen to the people who landed, or how long they could keep in touch with their fleet, and how secure a base and source of supplies a fleet off the beach landing every round of rifle ammunition through the surf would be. Some of our Civil War veterans who spent three years rolling in the seas off those coasts in the blockading squadrons and tried so hard to stay at their posts in all weathers, could tell some interesting things about life under those conditions. Our commanding officers at Daiquiri in 1898, when we landed our troops on the beach, could also tell some stimulating facts about their own anxieties lest the transport fleet be scattered in every direction by a West Indian hurricane. Yet that was a trifling undertaking compared to any possible invasion of the United States. Gen. Shafter's army, for instance, had only 75 cavalry horses with it, and, of course, no heavy siege guns, aeroplanes, motor transportation, etc.

Merely to state the problems shows into what endless fields of speculation and of mere personal opinion one may be led. With all respect for Admiral Fletcher, his views—whatever they may prove in detail to be—can doubtless be offset by many other military opinions. Moreover, when it comes to guessing upon such matters as these a civilian opinion may be just as valuable as a military, certainly on the question of the transportation problem. One may doubt, however, whether Admiral Fletcher would deny the recent statement (New York Times, August 21, 1915) of Capt. Charles E. Kilbourne, of the Army General Staff, that no frontal attack by a fleet upon coast fortifications has ever been successful in modern times, Captain Kilbourne describing the naval attack on the Dardanelles as a "hopeless failure," as was the direct assault on Port Arthur by the Japanese ships. To this he might have added that even if the German fleet were out of the way the British navy would never dare to attack the German coast fortifications, protected as they are by mine fields, by the most treacherous shoals through which the most experienced pilot would take no ship if all the buoys and marks were removed, and the light-houses extinguished. All of which merely reinforces the point already made that before any action towards further militarism is taken by the public the public should know precisely what our military problems are and what our real dangers. This knowledge should not be confined to the Army General Staff or to the Navy War College because those experts are bound to take counsel of their worst fears; they see darkly at all times, and, like all other military men the world over, never could be given enough men or ships or fortifications to satisfy them. If they could be thus satisfied, they would be unique in the history of militarism. If it is true, as Mr. Henry A. Wise Wood

asserts, that there are documents in the War Department proving that 750,000 men could be landed on our Atlantic Coast in forty-six days, and 350,000 on our Pacific Coast in sixty-one days, both armies with sufficient supplies for three months, then the public ought to know it, for that involves again the admission that our fleet is of no value whatever and that our coast defences are not worth the vast sums spent upon them since we began to modernize them in 1884.

QUESTIONS TO BE SETTLED.

And then the public should be told whether besides the fleet the army must be raised to a three-power standard, that is, to a size capable of meeting the supposititious maximum fleet and landing forces of England, Germany, and France. This knowledge is very important, not only for Americans, but for the rest of the world. For if we plunge into armament on any considerable scale it will mean that the foreign countries will begin to count us in on their two- or three-power plan, provided always that the peace to come in Europe does not do away with the whole abominable and wicked system of armament with its frightful injustice to the working classes,

upon whose bowed backs it hinds such monstrous burdens. Proof of this is the discussion in the British Parliament and the Reichstag in recent years of the necessity of increasing the British and German fleets because of the growing peril from the American. The announcement that the United States had definitely decided on a policy, namely that of building a purely defensive navy, and of putting complete faith for defence in that and our unsurpassed coast defences, would at least free the European nations from the fear of aggression by us, just as the adoption by us of the reverse policy would cause the European war lords to take due notice and give them the excuse to wring more millions out of their oppressed subjects, and to draft more of them for the unholy profession of arms.*

For the United States there is still another decision possible: that we cling to our historic policy of being unarmed; that we go along as heretofore keeping free from the European entanglements in

*Since the above was written, Lord Rosebery, the English statesman, has publicly said: "I know nothing more disheartening than the announcement recently made that the United States—the one great country left in the world free from the hideous, bloody burden of war—is about to embark upon the building of a huge armada destined to be equal or second to our own."

accordance with Washington's solemn admonition; that we instruct our Administrations to pursue the most pacific of policies, as President Wilson has but lately shown anew the power of the moral influence and the ideals of this nation to see us through a most difficult situation, and that we preserve our wealth for other and infinitely more valuable expenditures. For it must be clearly understood that, if we adopt either one of the other policies, we must at the smallest possible estimate increase our military expenditures to more than \$1,000,000,000 during the next five years. To-day we spend, for military purposes, with pensions, 74 cents out of every \$1 appropriated by Congress. We shall not only have to raise this figure to 90 cents, but vastly increase the number of dollars. Billion-and-a-half Congresses will be a matter of course. The income tax must go up and so must indirect taxes of every kind. We must also be prepared to starve education, the conservation of national resources, the development of rivers and harbors, of waste lands, and the betterment of social conditions in every direction. All as our tribute to the greatness of the German General Staff and the God of War!

WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH THE ARMY?

Injured by Political Interference from the Outside and Wastefulness and Sloth Within—Extravagance at West Point and Absurdity at Governor's Island—How We Misuse "Best Soldier Material on Earth"

IF THE advocates of peace were to run down the regular army as the advocates of greater preparedness have been decrying it during the last year, they would undoubtedly find themselves charged with being unpatriotic, if not traitorous, and certainly guilty of malicious hostility to our land-defence forces. The advocates of larger appropriations do not hesitate to denounce the army as being mismanaged and not up to its task, but they usually lay the blame upon Congress, which they say has "starved" the army, has insisted on the maintenance of forts of no earthly military value, built, like those at Helena, Mont., Cheyenne, Wyo., and Des Moines, Ia., for political purposes in order to placate certain powerful politicians, and perhaps thereby to purchase certain army reforms which could not otherwise have been attained. Senator Carter, of Montana; Congressman Hull, of Iowa, and Senator Warren, of Wyoming, were, in their persons, the "military necessity" for the construction of those three forts, which, like the one near Denver, ought long since to have been turned into civilian colleges and abandoned by the military.

But while politics has been the bane of the army, and Congress can be justly indicted for its treatment of the service, the faults in the army are by no means due to Congress alone. As any one who criticises the service and points

out its shortcomings, except in order to ask that the taxpayers pour out more money for its aggrandizement, is sure to be denounced, let me say at once that the statements in this and other articles are obtained chiefly from army officers, and from twenty-five years of personal observation and study; that they are actuated by no spirit of hostility toward any individuals, though frankly written from the point of view of one who does not believe in a large army, yet has for a quarter of a century labored diligently to bring about the wise expenditure of 100 cents for every dollar appropriated by Congress, and has invariably defended the army against the politicians. It was an able Secretary of War who remarked to the writer that the trouble with the army was that its "survey-boards did not survey, its courts-martial did not court-martial, its retirement boards did not retire, and its promotion boards did not properly promote"—a condition of affairs that cannot be attributed to Congress, though its causes hark back to politics.

INTERFERENCE OF POLITICS.

Indeed, this very Secretary of War consented to the setting aside of sentences of courts-martial and actions of other military tribunals for personal or political reasons. During his incumbency we had some of the worst cases ever

known of officers being jumped, through Presidential favoritism, over the heads of hundreds of others. Under this Secretary that order was first issued which Secretary Garrison is the first head of the War Department to enforce—that any officer using political influence should have it entered on its record against him.

But the politicians did not then stop going to the War Department; it was even carefully explained by officials to some of them that the order was issued merely to head off those who were not the Administration's favorites, or whose favor was not necessary to the Administration's success in Congress. Naturally, army officers stuck their tongues in their cheeks when this order was talked of and the old game of pull and politics went on as lightly as ever until the army discovered that Lindley M. Garrison meant business, and that the use of influence was being entered upon of officers' efficiency records against them.

Now the corridors of the War Department are not visited by Congressmen and Senators, and there is at this writing but one case on record where Presidential favoritism has been used to the detriment of the army under Mr. Wilson—a rather flagrant case, too. How can one expect army retiring boards to retire adequately if the War Department sets

aside their findings to oblige a Senator? The reason is known instantly, by the army grapevine telegraph, from Panama to Alaska and the Philippines, and the army guides itself accordingly.

It is only rarely that an officer is able to rise by merit. As soon as he enters the army, therefore, the young officer, if he is wise, marries the daughter of a Senator, or of a powerful newspaper owner, or of a millionaire contributor to campaign funds, and seeks to get ahead of his fellows not by superior diligence or ability, but by the free use of influence. It has been "the devil take the hindmost." When Congressman Hull, by reason of his being chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, was able to land his son, a man of only mediocre ability, in a position as major, from which he rose in ten years to be a colonel and judge-advocate at the age of only thirty-seven, what incentive is there to qualify for such a position by legal study and practice? Again, when the war broke out in 1898 a lot of men, some good and some bad, were ordered to Fort Monroe to take the physical examination for commissions. A number of them failed, but they were all appointed just the same. President McKinley saw nothing out of keeping with his oath of office in appointing them, although they might break down at once in the war when capable officers were needed, or, if not, were certain to load up the retired list at an early age. But how could any Secretary of War expect that particular examining board to take its work seriously or to "find" candidates when it knew that its reports were utterly ignored?

SOME CONSPICUOUS INSTANCES.

Is it any wonder in view of this régime of politics that the soldierly spirit in the army is at a low ebb? Take the list of our present generals, and run over the reasons for their appointment to high positions. Gen. Wood was promoted to the rank of a regular brigadier because he was credited with having cleaned up Cuba—an excellent achievement, but not a military one, he being, moreover, a doctor without military training. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss earned the same rank by being an admirable collector of customs at Havana, jumping up from the rank of major for this worthy but non-military service. Gen. Frederick Funston won the same position because of excellent work as a volunteer colonel, for which a captaincy would have sufficed had not the Kansas delegation achieved more; Gen. J. J. Pershing jumped from captain to brigadier avowedly because of a successful expedition in the Philippines, but really because he was a son-in-law of the all-powerful Wyoming Senator. Gen. Albert Mills rose in a bound from captain to brigadier, thanks to Roosevelt's favor, because he had the good luck to be wounded, in the first skirmish in 1898, near the Rough Rider Colonel, and was a well-thought-of officer.

Two of the present brigadiers won their rank by act of Congress for excellent service on the Panama Canal; they merited reward, of course, but why should they, trained and practiced chiefly as engineers, be put into a position to command troops when one has never drilled more than a company in his life and the other com-

manded a volunteer regiment for four days only?

The rewards given by Congress for Panama work have been utterly disproportionate on the military side and merely drive home to the service the lesson that the way to jump from colonel to major-general of the line, as Col. Goethals did against his wish, is by *brilliant work along non-military lines*. Naturally, Major-Gen. Goethals is not interested in holding that rank or commanding troops when he is an engineer, and so he proposes to retire as soon as his canal work is done. The late Major-Gen. Frederick Grant was, of course, a purely political appointment; and so it goes.

RECENT APPOINTMENTS FOR MERIT.

Only recently have there been appointed generals who really merited the rank in the eyes of the service, and there again the credit lies with the Wilson Administration. That several of the others like Bliss, Wood, and Funston have made good as generals in the opinion of the service, does not, of course, weaken the fact that their original appointments were subversive of the interests of the army. Even the present Chief of Staff, Gen. Scott, an excellent man, of particular usefulness in Indian and Mexican negotiating, won his rapid rise under Mr. Wilson not by military exploits, but by non-military traits, his knowledge of Indians, their sign language, his skill as a plenipotentiary, etc.

This lack of the real soldierly spirit is the great weakness of the service today. By that is not meant that the army should acquire Prussian arrogance or embrace the spirit of Prussian militarism—though there are some officers quite ready to go the whole hog—but it ought to acquire German industry, German application, and German thoroughness. Judged by those standards a good part of the American army is lazy. Supposing every regiment of regulars were ordered to march out of its barracks and drill every day from 5 A. M. until eleven o'clock, as the German regiments do for months at a time—what would happen? There would all but be mutiny. The regiments would be depleted by desertions and most of the officers would think of resigning or would run to their Congressmen for help. Yet it is just such hard work that makes a fine army.

Foreign officers admire our West Point without exception; but there is no reason on earth, they say, why the excellence of drill attained there should not be the standard of the army. If it can be achieved in one place, it can in another. Yet the regular regiments that have passed through New York recently, notably the Thirtieth Infantry, have marched so badly and generally appeared so slack that in most foreign armies the colonel commanding would have been instantly cashiered or retired. Yet the physical material in that regiment was superb and the men looked wonderfully fit. Good marching on parade is not everything, and neither is soldierly appearance; but if they are worth the time and labor spent on them at West Point they are worth it in the service. Good shooting is worth far more, and so is the knowledge of how to care for one-

self in the field, how to intrench, etc., etc. But as a matter of fact every real soldier knows that drill is at the foundation of discipline as the alphabet and reading are at the bottom of mental discipline.

The great trouble is that the newly graduated cadet finds the service slack, many poor colonels, and latterly far more interest in athletics than in purely military functions. There is no incentive to soldierliness, and no chance to advance oneself by rigid application to routine drills. Often a West Pointer, who was a model in his bearing at the Academy, slouches like any civilian appointee.

For this Congress is not responsible. Nor is it accountable for the gross extravagance in the service, and the constant lack of soldierly honor in dealing with the money Congress votes. If there ever was a wasteful branch of the Government, it is the army. I have myself seen it march away from manoeuvre grounds and leave behind shower-baths and other facilities erected at a cost of thousands—for the near-by farmers to profit by.

A post surgeon recently requested, and his request was approved by the post commander, a \$30,000 isolation hospital. The Secretary of War ascertained that there had been not one or two contagious cases in a year there; but that did not interest the surgeon. Another wanted a costly flight of stairs because the old one was worn out. A high official and three or four generals tested the stairs; they were perfectly sound, but being slightly worn, were offensive to the surgeon. Was not Uncle Sam's Treasury full? Why not turn to it?

But the classic example is West Point. If there ever was a colossal blunder, it was the reconstruction of West Point. It is architecturally beautiful; every conceivable comfort is provided. There is a power station there that is wonderful, and as spick and span as a cadet on full-dress parade. The gymnasium is superb, and, that the sons of Mars may know something about the Prince of Peace (though He was a Peace-at-any-Price man), there is a \$450,000 Protestant chapel, which is one of the most beautiful church edifices extant. The post is lined with splendid officers' quarters, costing from \$20,000 up, and the Superintendent has just asked for thirty or forty more, at \$20,000 apiece. The administration offices are magnificent Gothic, and the cadets' quarters are quite beautiful compared to the plain ones that Sherman, Sheridan, Lee, and Grant occupied. What a lesson for the humble farmers' sons, the offspring of the plain American people! What a contrast to the real democracy with which the student body is recruited! What a complete reversal of the lessons of simple, hard living that a soldier ought to be taught!

But the officers who have controlled West Point care nothing for the example set by Kaiser Wilhelm I of Germany, who sipped in his palace on his soldier's iron cot until the end of his life.

SOME WEST POINT EXTRAVAGANCES.

It actually costs \$20,000, I have been informed in military circles, to educate a boy at West Point, as against \$12,000 at

Annapolis. I do not vouch for the correctness of the figure, but give it as it came to me. It is said to cost Harvard \$2,500 for each student. Of course, Harvard does not house or feed its students free of charge or pay them, but the disproportion is still far too great.

The Military Academy bill contains a provision of \$17,700 in extra pay for officers, in addition to their regular salaries, and the Superintendent is asking \$125,000 for a laundry which will wash several times as many clothes for the women and children of the Academy as for its cadets. What ideas as to what army posts ought to be will these cadets carry away with them? What are they to think when they see women living in costly quarters obtained from Congress on the plea that they were to be used only as bachelor quarters? What are they to think of the use of Cullum Memorial Hall for teas and social events of all kinds, as to which there is no reference in Gen. Cullum's will? Or of officers families boarding in a part of the costly bachelor officers' mess? Or that there are four and a half persons, chiefly women and children, at West Point to each cadet? That there are already 110 detached officers in addition to civilian teachers to an average of 620 cadets, and many more are asked for? That the officers' quarters contain fine mahogany furniture, costing between \$400 and \$500 of the taxpayers' money? Can they take away any other idea than that an army post or school is erected primarily for the purpose of promoting the personal welfare and comfort of officers and their families, particularly their families?

The truth is that West Point is, because of its physical formation, not at all adapted for its purposes; but the fact that there is not enough drill ground now for 600 men in open-order tactics does not prevent the present Superintendent from asking that the corps be increased to 1,400 men.

ABSURDITY AT GOVERNOR'S ISLAND.

Of course, West Point is not the only place where one finds this waste of the public funds on the recommendation of army officers. What could be more useless than Governor's Island, the chief purpose of which is to provide a pleasant home for thirty or forty officers? Its garrison is needless, and no other army in the world would put a battalion of infantry on a little island where it could not march to save its souls. Hundreds of thousands of dollars would be saved if the place were closed up, the officers made to live on their allowances for commutation of quarters in the city of New York or Newark or New Rochelle, or wherever they pleased, just as the officers of German and French regiments find their own family quarters; no one cares where they live as long as they are on hand for duty. Surely, Gen. Barry, a real soldier among our generals, is entitled to great credit for holding down some of the extravagances at West Point, and particularly for preventing the waste of \$25,000 for quarters there for the Secretary of War and the President of the United States (to be used once a year perhaps), for he was going

directly against the popular current in the army.

Truly, if West Point is to be regarded as setting the tone of the army, then the tone of the service is one of un-military living, and needless extravagance, with the emphasis on anything but those ascetic and virile qualities and rigid, plain standards of living that go so far to make the true soldier. The cadets even go into camp in tents with permanent wood floors, electric lights, etc., and only once in a year do they leave the Point for a long march! Is it any wonder that a Bavarian general once said to me after seeing West Point:

"Your academy is splendid, your Corps of Cadets is magnificent, but, if I were the Superintendent, I would march them away from the academy and put them into camp in the hills behind the Point."

NOT STUDYING THE PRESENT WAR.

Is it surprising to learn that the large maps of the seats of war placed in the officers' mess at West Point at the outbreak of the war have been taken down because the fifty officers who resort to that mess are no longer sufficiently interested in the war to make it worth while to retain them?

I asked particularly the other day whether there were not weekly quizzes on the progress of the war there; whether the senior officers are not lecturing weekly on the strategy of the campaign as it is unfolded; whether they are not playing the war-game as it is presented in each one of the fields of operation, but I was assured that nothing of the kind had happened—incredible as it may seem—except a couple of lectures by a professor and some study by a little group of nine young officers, when the cadets, to say nothing of the officers, are supposed to be learning the art of war. That in itself is the most striking proof of the lack of the military spirit which is the chief evil in the army, and for which Congress is not responsible.

And what are cadets, and what is the public to think of the grave scandal which has just been developed at the trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Goodier now going on in San Francisco, at which officers have sworn that certain of their brother-officers of the Aviation Section have been drawing the 35 per cent. increase of regular pay, which is by law awarded to officers who are risking their lives by actually making ascensions, when they could not even handle an aeroplane? It was charged, under oath, that Captain Cowan, commanding the Aviation School at San Diego, had been drawing \$113 a month extra pay since July, 1913, although not capable of taking a machine into the air alone, and Captain Cowan has admitted that he drew this unearned pay for twenty-five months! Does this not again suggest the need of a higher standard of conduct by officers towards their Government, or at least a new kind of preparedness for an officer's career?

The truth is that in many directions resources available are knowingly diverted from military to non-military purposes, as for instance in the matter of trans-

portation; we have not modern military transportation, but plenty of money for busses and ambulances and non-military vehicles. They even run a bus line from one end of West Point to the other. Into the effect of all this upon the enlisted men of the army and their free use for non-military purposes, such as officers' servants, care-takers, etc., there is not space to touch in this article; but everyone who knows the army, knows what an abuse it is, and how it reduces the number of men available for military drills. It verges dangerously near the line of "honest graft," which reminds me that when the camp at Texas City of a whole division of our troops was broken up by the cyclone in August last, there were downright charges by a service journal that no worse place for military purposes could have been selected than the site of this camp, as to which this defender of preparedness declared there were grave rumors of real graft.

It is interesting to note, too, that the storm nipped in the bud as it were, the erection of several large dancing pavilions and club houses that were being built by the troops—military duty again—for the use of themselves some nights in the week, and of their officers the others. I have been trying my best to recall, if I ever heard of dance-halls being erected by French or German regiments, and I cannot remember that I ever did.

THE BEST MATERIAL ON EARTH.

Now the maddening thing about all this is that we can do a great deal better if we wish to, for we have the best material on earth out of which to build armies. No one surpasses the American in natural adaptability and the ability to think for himself. Take the story of Funston's Kansas regiment. It is exactly like that of hundreds of volunteer regiments in the Civil War, but it is an amazing tale of resourcefulness, of daring, dash, and Yankee ingenuity, and natural born soldiering, without much drill and next to no discipline. These fine qualities are there and available. Why do we not get them in peace times? Moreover, there are a number of able officers in our service who see the needs and deplore the whole present situation, and would do differently if they could, who do not believe in the Government's buying of polo ponies and foxhounds or running a lot of costly suburban communities, but would like to train real soldiers. Why is it that for an expenditure far out of proportion to what the German army costs—we have put, according to a statement of Chairman Hay of the House Military Affairs Committee, \$1,007,410,270.48 into the army in the last ten fiscal years, 1905 to 1915, which is not so bad for a niggardly Congress—we do not get a regular army as good man for man as that of the German and the French?

Incidentally, the taxpayer should ask himself whether he ought to heed the advocates of preparedness in adding more sums to the frightful waste that is going on, without the slightest assurance that he will have a bit more efficient or more military army than he has to-day. It is throwing good money after bad.

THE PRESENT MILITARY FOUNDATION

Defects in the Existing Organization of the Army—More Money Does Not Assure Greater Efficiency—Heaven-Sent Opportunity Neglected by President and Secretary of War

CONGRESSMAN HAY, Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, recently wrote in the *Sunday Magazine* of the liberal \$101,000,000 appropriated by Congress for the army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1915, and declared:

"To say that the use of such money in the hands of officers of the United States Army does not make us efficient in a military sense, is to attack unjustifiably the ability of a set of men famous the world over for their contributions to military science."

What could be more preposterous? One might as well assume that because \$200,000,000 a year is spent by such honorable and patriotic gentlemen as compose the Board of Estimate of New York for the city's upkeep, therefore every cent is wisely and economically disbursed! We know it is not; we know that it is honestly disbursed, but every one is aware that savings could be made; that legislative enactments require a good deal of expenditure that the city officials would never sanction; that bad business methods of the past take their toll, and that there are leaks and wastes in plenty which can only gradually be eliminated by that slow introduction of better methods adopted after most careful study and inquiry, which is now going on.

So in the army; every one knows that honesty prevails; that grafting is almost unknown and that an embezzlement among officers is of the rarest. Yet every one should also be aware that despite the enormous sums voted we have very small military results to show for the \$100,000,000 which we have been spending annually, on an average, during the last ten years. In that period our army has averaged about 85,000 men. It cost, therefore, over \$1,000 a man to provide the necessary arms, quarters, pay, supplies, fortifications, etc., for a force of that size, and the taxpayer is without guarantee whatever that his army is efficient. Pacifists, militarists, and Secretaries of War, all are united in saying that we do not begin to get what we pay for; that the army is wasteful and extravagant because of antiquated and red tape business methods, the slowness of disbursements, the extravagant expenditure characteristic of most Government bureaus, the placing of the emphasis upon luxuriant accommodations and private comforts rather than upon absolute military efficiency, and particularly because of the interference of politicians. Under the circumstances, for Congressman Hay to point to his \$101,000,000 and swear we are *therefore* militarily efficient is as absurd as to assume that if Congress votes \$180,000,000 or \$200,000,000 this year for further preparedness we shall get greater efficiency at the very hands and by the very meth-

ods that have been causing us waste and extravagance heretofore.

MORE MONEY DOESN'T GUARANTEE EFFICIENCY.

There is not the slightest reason to assume that we shall even get a greater degree of military efficiency. A poor army does not become a good army in any country because you vote it, or give it, more men, more guns, and more ammunition. Russia has demonstrated that, not only in this war, but long before this war hove in sight.

It is precisely here that Mr. Garrison and President Wilson have thrown away their great opportunity—an almost heaven-sent opportunity—to reform and overhaul the whole military establishment. If they had said to the country and to Congress:

"This whole thing is preposterous, because our methods are wrong and the real military spirit is lacking; we shall not recommend or ask the voting of a dollar additional until you overhaul the entire system, do away with the political forts, put a stop to the whole business of building extravagant suburban villages for our troops, and thoroughly investigate the entire military situation. When you have done this and cut millions upon millions out of our present Army bill, we shall recommend the additional defences which we think the sea-coast needs."

It is a double blunder that they have committed, which smacks plainly both of short-sightedness and lack of statesmanship. In deciding to arm further at this stage of the world war without awaiting its outcome, they have in part thrown away the commanding position of the United States as the one great nation that was not arming, and, therefore, was in the best position to advocate universal disarmament at the close of the war; and they have neglected the best chance for a great internal reform, for the introduction of scientific management in one branch of the Government, that will probably ever come to them.

BUILDING ON BAD FOUNDATION.

With an unsatisfactory and out of date military foundation, never well built, as was conclusively shown in 1898, they are preparing to build upon that foundation an enormously costly additional superstructure which will inevitably partake of the weaknesses of the foundation. With the only bit of scientific management the army has ever known—that introduced into some of our arsenals by General Crozier, the chief of ordnance—practically ended by the dictation of labor unions, it is a crying shame that the Secretary and President did not unitedly stand for introducing this system throughout the army. The country would have listened to them as one man because it would

have recognized at once that this is the first step, and the best step, toward national preparedness, if we really need any preparedness.

More than that, groups of fine young officers would have arisen in the service to cooperate and even to take the lead. The whole military spirit of the army would have been quickened and rejuvenated. It would have obtained an entirely new sense of its duty and responsibility to the Government if required to see to it that not only 100 cents are obtained for every dollar expended, but that at least 90 per cent. of that dollar is given to constructive military expenditure. Such a reorganization would have given the army new life and new pride in the service.

If Congress knows its business and is not stampeded into voting the President's programme, by the party lash; if it is actuated by purely patriotic considerations and really desires efficient preparedness, if it is not going to vote large sums under newspaper clamor or with the quiet purpose of securing as large a part of that expenditure for particular political bailiwicks, it will itself insist upon such an overhaul and investigation. If that sounds too much like a counsel of perfection; if it is expecting too much of our Congress, so much the worse.

THE GREED FOR "PORK."

I was reliably told in Washington that Congressmen were already serving notice on Mr. Garrison that he would not get a dollar from them for preparedness unless they were assured that their especially pet political forts, or arsenals, or what not, were to be left undisturbed. Discouraging as that, if true, would be, and as the outlook for reform is, it is plainly the duty of Congress to inquire what has become of the enormous sums already voted. The German Kaiser is said to have remarked that his army and navy did not cost him more than ours, including pensions. This Congress ought to ascertain, and the reasons why this is so, beside the superficial ones that lie on the surface. Let it find out, for instance, whether many expenditures made, like that at Governor's Island, have not actually hindered the obtaining of real military results. Let it not vote two or three hundred millions more in the two years of its life without the most careful examination of the past and the most careful supervision of future expenditures.

It does not pay in this matter to trust to the experts. The writer was, perhaps, the first journalist in this country to advocate a General Staff, but that august body has been vastly more concerned with planning increases of the army (with unavoidable benefits in the way of increased rank to its members) than with pounding away in season and out of sea-

son. upon the deficiencies in the service which would still stand in the way of anything like an efficient army if it were increased to 500,000 men to-morrow.

One of the ablest officers in the service, a graduate of West Point, of nearly forty years' service, who does not share the writer's views as to preparedness, says frankly that, as long as the army is "self-governed and self-inspected, it can never be trusted to govern itself well." He insists that there must be more stringent and direct civilian control by Congress; but he admits, of course, that heretofore Congress has declined to accept its responsibility in an unselfish spirit. He believes that no expert opinion, whether from the General Staff or any one else, should be accepted without the most rigid outside scrutiny. If, as he says, the inspections in the army are "usually farces, often overruled and restricted by order, so that they tend to degenerate into merely formal affairs carried on in order to see that the routine of the service is adhered to," there may well be reason to assume that the higher authorities in the army are not as keen to remedy any defects as they should be. Thus, Gen. Wood has been making hundreds of speeches in the past year, urging more troops and more reserves; I have read many reports of those speeches, but I have not found in one any reference to what is the matter with the army itself.

It is also suggested that, according to an army officer who ought to know, the first plan for an increase in the army that came from the General Staff to Secretary Garrison began with a provision for a full general and several lieutenant-generals, major-generals by the dozen, and brigadiers by the score. If this officer is correct, these were not recommendations that really aimed at increased efficiency.

DETAILS SHOULD BE SCRUTINIZED.

How important it is that the details of any increase scheme should be carefully studied, appears from the question how shall the army be enlarged. Supposing 30,000 men are to be added: Shall this be done by adding 30 more regiments of 1,000 men each? Most officers would say "yes." They would point out that regiments cannot be raised hastily in war-time, and quickly drilled, and would insist that we cannot have too many extra officers.

Probably most of the men giving this advice would not be consciously influenced by the fact that this would mean a promotion of 30 lieutenant-colonels, and 60 majors and 150 captains, and that therefore they would inevitably profit thereby; some might even, and probably would, regret that their own fortunes were tied up with the question.

But there is another side to the matter. European regiments number from 2,500 to 3,000 men; in Germany there are more than 200 men in a company in peace time so that a subaltern commands a "Zug" of about 70 men. We allow three officers to a company and the war time strength of that company is 112 and of a regiment approximately 1,300. Why should we continue to stick at this figure?

The Civil War showed how rapidly regiments of 1,000 men thinned down to tiny battalions of 350. In one campaign, in 1864, a Connecticut heavy artillery regiment serving as infantry, shrank from 1,200 to 400 men in about six weeks time. The Canadian Princess Patricia Regiment is known to have been reduced to 135 in a fortnight at the front. In peace time our regular regiments are weak at a strength of 800, and few of them approximate that size. They usually average between 600 and 750.

Every officer knows that this is an inefficient number. In a recent article which appeared in the *Journal of the U. S. Cavalry Association*, Captain S. D. Rockenbach, 11th Cavalry, told some wholesome truths not often seen in print, at least by laymen, as to the present organization. He writes as follows:

"My testimony after nearly twenty-four years of commissioned service is that under the organization and system we have, it is impossible to make a troop efficient for war. If it is the overhead cost that counts, why can't we get the men to work with? Supposing we got the 41 [men of a troop] ready for combat without stunting their mental and physical growth, what would be left of them in a week's, a month's campaign, without a depot squadron to send up trained men and horses? We delude ourselves with the idea that we have a great excess of regular officers in time of peace; we must, but we must have something to train them with. I would have learned more in two years with a full troop, in a full squadron, in a full regiment, in a full brigade, in a full division, than I have in ten times that length of time under the existing conditions. Yet the American public expects the regular officer to be supertrained in the art and science of war practically."

INCREASE EXISTING UNITS.

There is no doubt that if Captain Rockenbach were asked what he would do with 30,000 more men for the army, he would put them into the existing troops, squadrons, regiments, brigades, and divisions. That would be real scientific management both from the point of view of the army and the point of view of the taxpaying public which is desirous of efficiency and does not want to be taxed for colonels and majors that add strength to the army only on paper. There could be no clearer illustration of the point that I have been trying to drive home in this entire article: that the foundation system of the army is wrong and that piling on more organizations without remedying the defects would be folly. Why is it not the proper thing to raise our regiments to 2,400 or 3,000 men at once if we must have more soldiers? It is interesting to note that some advance towards this policy appears in Mr. Garrison's plan to have three of the new regular regiments he proposes recruited to our war strength; but that is less than half the peace strength of some European regiments. If additional officers are needed, let Congress provide them separately to be used for detached service as are hundreds of officers to-day

who are away from regimental work.

It is interesting also to note how Captain Rockenbach arrives at the figure of 41 men cited above, which he says could not be trained for a month under war conditions without needing reserves of men and horses. This is his very important analysis of an average troop of cavalry as it reports for duty in our army to-day.

Troop N, Xth U. S. Cavalry, has on the 24th of May:

Aggregate	81
Present and absent	73
Training remounts	13
Charge of stables	2
In quarters—1 mess sgt., 2 cooks, 2 room orderlies	5
D. S., absent sick and furlough	6
Recruits	1
Sick	8
S. D., veterinary hospital and exchange ..	2
Machine-gun troop	2
Headquarter troop	1
<hr/>	
Total absent from drill (combat)	35
Total present for drill (combat)	41

The only criticism of this that most officers would make is that he does not allow sufficiently for detached service, for men on guard duty, acting as servants to officers, gardeners, etc. But as is the strength of the troop so is the strength of the regiment.

Everybody who has served knows the thrill and the inspiration that come from full ranks and large numbers. Is it any wonder that Capt. Rockenbach writes that "we do not admit that the regular army is inefficient, but, when we say that it is efficient, the American public should understand our mental reservations. It is efficient not considering any possible or probable use against modern troops, only up to 50 per cent. of its total strength, and it would not last a brief campaign against a modern army, even could we find one so small as to take us seriously and fight us. . . There should be no compromise, either a proper army or none at all, and once for all remove the delusion from the minds of the public as to their protection."

There are dozens of officers who share Capt. Rockenbach's feeling; there are dozens of problems, just like this one of where the proposed increase of men if voted should be placed, that ought not to be decided offhand either by President or Secretary or Congress, and the last persons whose advice should be taken as final in this matter are the men who are responsible in the army for the present system which Capt. Rockenbach so clearly thinks a grave mistake.

If the system of the regular army is a mistake, or is inefficient in any degree, is it not absolute folly to graft upon it the reserve army of 400,000 men which Mr. Garrison and the General Staff have proposed and the President has accepted? What guarantee is there that the 400,000 reserves will be relatively even as efficient as our regulars? How can we avoid the conclusion that it is the duty of Congress to make our existing system modern, efficient, and really worth while before it adds one dollar to the one hundred millions it now blindly lavishes? The road to real preparedness, if we must prepare, leads no other way.

SOME OBSTACLES TO EFFICIENCY IN THE ARMY

Despite West Point Training and Ostensibly Rigid Examinations, Many Unfit Continue in Service—Shining Exceptions of the Ordnance Corps—Effects of Certain Social Conditions

WHY is it there is not greater military efficiency in our regular army to-day? The average layman can understand that politics has done serious damage to the service, and much money is wasted through the construction of costly barracks which are in effect costly suburban villages. He knows, too, that all Government departments are apt to be loosely administered as contrasted with private concerns organized to make money.

What the layman cannot understand is why there should not be among the officers of the service a high standard of professional efficiency. Are not 40 per cent. of the officers graduates of West Point? Have not hundreds of them attended the graduate schools in the army? Are there not examinations for promotion? Are not civilian candidates and those who would rise from the ranks rigidly tested? How can it be, therefore, that the army itself is inefficient?

To this the answer is: *Primarily because the individual officer is held practically to no standard of professional efficiency, and this despite examinations for promotion, efficiency records, etc.*

The law calling for the examination of all officers below the rank of major before they can be promoted to the next highest rank has, it is true, existed ever since 1891. At the present time there are under suspension for promotion for one year one captain and three first lieutenants who have failed in their first examinations, but during all these years since the law was passed only seventeen line officers have been dropped from the army for failure to qualify professionally. Fully nine-tenths of those suspended are passed on reexamination, and in one case an officer who was discharged from the artillery arm and reappointed to the cavalry arm has been serving acceptably ever since.

Now, it would be most gratifying if we could assume that this record meant that the high professional ability of the officers of the army was easily demonstrable, for it would show that there is vastly less professional mortality among our officers than among a similar group of lawyers and doctors, to speak of only two other expert professions.

BUT MANY UNFIT SLIP THROUGH.

But every Secretary of War knows, and every officer knows, that the examining board is not nearly as rigid as it ought to be, and that many a man slips through who is professionally unfit to continue in the service. Either because the board does not set high enough standards or because it has become discouraged by political interference with the verdicts of other examining boards, or because out of a kind-heartedness toward a fellow-officer, which is one of the greatest weaknesses of the service, it

sometimes gives a man a passing mark for the sake of his future and that of his wife and his children.

It is unfortunately the truth that there is no punishment for an officer who is professionally slack or lazy or who is unfit, precisely as there is no real reward for an officer who does his routine work zealously, studies incessantly to keep himself abreast of military development at home and abroad, and seeks in every way to fit himself for high command. There is a saying that to lose his commission an officer must either commit a crime or go far beyond the limits of toleration in bad personal habits. Let him be as dull as an ox, let him be temperamentally unfitted to command men, let him be so crabbed and narrow as to be a nuisance whenever he fills a position of independent command, he is still sure of his rank if his personal habits are exemplary—that is, if he does not drink, or steal, or offend against other commandments. Moreover, he will rise steadily in rank and retire with a handsome pension at the end of his service.

On the other hand, the man who has soldierly instincts, is devoted to his career, and is willing to work day and night for personal advancement and the benefit of the service—there are many such in the army—soon finds that nothing that he can do will advance him except in rare, exceptional cases. In the past, such an officer has needed political influence to get him ahead. It is true that at all times he won the esteem of those with whom he came in contact who valued a good officer. At times some bureau chief or some general during the Spanish War was able to pick out such an officer for temporary volunteer rank or for some important assignment. Such an officer, too, might find his way to the War College and the General Staff, but the chances have been that he must sit by and see an officer like Gen. Clarence R. Edwards jump from captain to brigadier-general, not because of any military service of distinction whatever, but because he was an excellent chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs—non-military service again—and a warm personal friend of William H. Taft. Such an incident as that alone gravely discourages many a professionally zealous officer.

HOW EXAMINATIONS HAVE WORKED.

Yet high hopes were builded upon the examination for promotion when it was instituted. The examiners were given a wide latitude, and as it often happened that a man was examined far away from his regiment, it was hoped that social influence would be reduced to a minimum. But it hasn't worked that way, and the standards of examination have varied so much here and there—that is, an examining board at Manila might be so

much more rigid than one at Fort Leavenworth—as to work an injustice to the service. Hence, for a time an effort was made to have all officers in continental America examined by one board in Fort Leavenworth. But this too has been abandoned and men are constantly passed upward who ought not to be advanced. Moreover, it is ridiculous to say that because a man has qualified as major, therefore he does not need to be tested as to his fitness for lieutenant-colonel or colonel or brigadier-general or major-general. There is no reason whatever why examinations should stop with the captain, but every reason that more and more severe tests should be applied, as officers rise higher in rank and assume increasing responsibilities for the welfare and discipline and efficiency of their subordinates in peace and for their lives, as well, in war time.

It seems to be generally admitted today that the German army is the most efficient in the world. It is the German army which is most rigid in its examination of officers and its elimination of men who are unfit. No major can become a lieutenant-colonel until he has demonstrated that he can fulfil the functions of a lieutenant-colonel under the eyes of a board of officers whose devotion to the service is so great that they do not hesitate to cut him off and end his career if he does not qualify. A German major is expected to show that he is fitted to be a colonel, and a lieutenant-colonel that he can, if necessary, take hold of a brigade. Social influence does not avail, neither does rank, and to a lesser degree the same has been true in France, but that it is in a lesser degree is brought out by the large number of French generals who have been summarily retired by Gen. Joffre.

When President Taft made Capt. Edwards a brigadier-general because he had been an excellent bureaucrat in Washington, he did not know whether Gen. Edwards really had the qualities of a general or not, because Capt. Edwards had never even commanded a regiment, much less a brigade. There was nothing to indicate that Gen. Edwards, if suddenly given command of a brigade in Mexico, would demonstrate that he had the capacity for the handling of masses of men, or had the personal quality of quick decision in emergencies which the successful general must have. Perhaps Gen. Edwards would prove to have these qualities. It is extraordinary how many of our haphazard generals have become valuable. But that is luck, or is due to American adaptability under responsibility, and is not because, but in spite of, as vicious a system of appointment as could be imagined.

GRATIFYING SIGNS OF REFORM.

Lately, it is gratifying to record, Sec-

retary Garrison has adopted the policy of promoting colonels to brigadier-generals, not because of any conspicuous non-military service or in response to political pressure or social influence or friendship, but on the recommendation of the various generals, the General Staff corps, etc. But, gratifying as this departure is, it does not in itself give any assurances of stability, nor does it help to weed out the inefficient in the lower grades.

Among the officers who have been much stirred by this state of affairs is the chief of ordnance, Brig.-Gen. William Crozier. In season and out of season, on every occasion, he has urged that we introduce into our army a system of promotion, not by seniority, that is, longevity, but by selection, the selection of the worthy and industrious officers and the elimination of the unworthy. He aims, in other words, at the introduction of a merit system, and in principle every one must agree with him, particularly because, as will be shown later, he has applied those principles to his own, the Ordnance Corps. If it could be carried out without favoritism or social or political influence, it would make an ideal system. The difficulty is that in a republic it seems almost impossible to constitute a board of officers which shall be free from these hampering influences, and a system of selection which was influenced by other than purely military considerations would be more demoralizing than the present one.

FAILURE OF NAVY PLUCKING BOARD.

The experience of the navy's "plucking board" does not lead to the belief that the right kind of a board to promote by selection could be formed.

Mr. Roosevelt and many others were certain when this navy board was constituted in 1901 that it solved the difficulty in the navy, and that the board could be relied upon to do justice. Yet the last Congress abolished the board, whose decisions had in some cases caused the bitterest heart-burnings. For the army, none the less, it appears that for the present the best policy is elimination for military unfitness or incapacity. That is, by the slow process of improving the moral tone of the service the promotion boards, like the courts-martial, must be educated up to performing their functions without thought of anything but the interests of the service. As long as this is not done the army personnel will be far from the maximum of efficiency.

As long as it is *not done* all the money that President Wilson and Mr. Garrison may get from Congress for additional officers and men will not in a single respect improve the morale of the army, but will merely add to its numbers. It will in no wise give us a more efficient army than we have now, for true preparedness has much less to do with numbers than it has with the spirit and military efficiency of our army.

Now, Gen. Crozier is not merely an officer who preaches; he practices what he preaches, and the result is that the Ordnance Corps, over which he presides, is to-day the one highly efficient branch of the army. Why? Because he can eliminate unworthy officers and reward the worthy that come to his corps. This

is due to the fact that, barring some permanent ones, the bulk of his officers are detailed from the line, after a most searching examination, for periods of four years. After these four years they must go back to the cavalry or artillery or infantry, whence they came, and serve two years with troops, before being again eligible for re-detail to the Ordnance. If an officer did not do well while with the Ordnance, Gen. Crozier simply forgets his existence; he has no right to demand a re-detail. If he is a good officer, Gen. Crozier keeps his eye on him and gets him back when the two years with troops are up.

Moreover, Gen. Crozier made his corps especially attractive by getting from Congress increased rank for the officers that come to him. That is, if a second lieutenant is detailed to the Ordnance, he gets the rank and pay of a first lieutenant during his four years of service; if a first lieutenant is detailed he gets the rank and pay of a captain; if it is a captain who goes to the Ordnance, he receives the rank and pay of a major as a reward for his ambition, for his zeal in volunteering for the Ordnance, and his industry in fitting himself for the searching technical examination.

RECOGNIZED BY PRIVATE INDUSTRIES.

I am one of those who think that the rush to secure Gen. Crozier's officers for civilian arms factories this year is in large part a tribute to the kind of men Gen. Crozier has secured by his merit system. Even in these boom times private concerns that have to earn dividends pick and choose their superintendents, and do not select military automata for responsible positions.

This is the only way to-day in the entire army in which an officer can advance himself in rank and pay by his own industry and merit! Surely, before it builds further upon the present unsatisfactory military foundation, Congress ought to inquire into the whole situation and ask Gen. Crozier and others why it is that this bit of scientific management cannot in one form or another be applied to the entire service.

A few years ago another device, which, if applied to the entire army and rigidly enforced, would do much good, was introduced into the Engineer Corps. It was provided by law that, when an officer was appointed to that corps as a second lieutenant from civil life, he should serve as a probationary officer for the period of one year, at the expiration of which he could be dropped for professional incapacity, moral unfitness, or, what is even more important, temperamental unfitness for the military profession. So far only two officers have been appointed under this law, and neither has been dropped. But the scheme is an admirable one, and, as has been urged by Lieut.-Col. Robert H. Noble, of the infantry, ought to be applied to all second lieutenants, whether appointed from the ranks, from West Point, or from civil life. There would be some considerable chance of this being enforced because a new officer has not formed any of those domestic ties which play so great a part in army life and in the decisions of its boards and courts. The War Department could withhold from such an officer permission to marry.

It would all make the probationer walk a very straight line during his first year, and work very hard. While a choleric colonel might occasionally do an injustice in dropping an officer, the injustice would be slight compared to the good that would result if men were freely discharged when they failed to show industry, good character, and adaptability to the profession of soldiering. The Germans call some of their candidates for commissions "Offiziersaspiranten"—which tells the whole story.

Congress ought not to add thousands of additional officers to the army in the year 1916 without throwing this and other safeguards around their appointment, for nine-tenths of them will be inexperienced and with only the slightest military training, if any. Among them will be many temperamentally unfit or unable to exercise the power to command.

ATHLETICS AND DOMESTICITY.

There are officers in the army who think that athletics and domesticity are injuring the service to-day as much as whiskey did in the old days when the army was scattered over the plains. It is unquestionably true that the providing of homes for officers has become an almost unmitigated evil, and no survey of the causes of the army's inefficiency would be complete without a reference to it. I have already touched upon it, but it is worth while to record the fact that the American army is the only one that makes a practice of providing officers' families with residences. The custom grew up in the days of frontier duty and Indian-fighting when forts were forts and not barracks or cantonments. Now the most important posts are in or near cities so that the army could make vast savings if it allowed liberal sums for rentals and made the officers live in the towns. This might not be practical in Alaska or Panama or at certain remote coast artillery stations; but if the Government simply abandoned the policy of housing officers' families, it would save enough to maintain a number of regiments, besides doing away with a large amount of special "duty" as gardeners, servants, ice-suppliers, bus-drivers, postmen, etc., a detached service which, as already pointed out, leads to intense dissatisfaction among the enlisted men, besides depleting the strength of companies. In some cases it has led in fact to the abandonment of guard duty. To one familiar with the old army it is something of a shock to see the disappearance of sentries and the substitution of post policemen; for sentry duty, in the West at least, was one thing that was never slighted, and it has heretofore been deemed one of the most important functions of the soldier. But it is now disappearing as is the historic cavalry seat, which has been abandoned in our army in favor of the (for military purposes) abominable hunting seat.

EFFECT OF CERTAIN SOCIAL CONDITIONS.

Just what effect the suburban village type of barracks has upon the moral tone and social life of the army has often been set forth and never flatteringly. It is never good for a group of

families to be thrown together constantly, any more than it is good for single men to live in barracks. Purely academic communities suffer in the same way as military posts, yet they are without the endless dissensions due to jealousies arising out of rank, precedence, etc., and are supposed to be absorbed in intellectual pursuits. It would be a gross libel on the army to accept Gen. Charles King's novels as a true picture of garrison conditions; but if one-fifth were true they would be an unanswerable argument for the simple system in vogue in England and all the Continental armies of letting army officers live like other folks and not apart from their own kind. It would do them infinite good to live among the people of the United States, for it would broaden them and render them less likely to consider themselves a caste, superior to all in civil life. There are plenty of officers

who have sought detached service and been for years away from their regiments expressly to avoid the conditions of life in posts like Missoula, Benjamin Harrison, Logan, etc., just as there are officers who have served abroad who have earnestly urged the placing of all our regiments in barracks in cities as a step towards efficiency.

Why would it not pay Congress to inquire into all of this before it adds new regiments to our army? Is it the pork-barrel which prevents? Or is it the failure of the army leaders to point the way? Or is it both? The public ought to know. Incidentally, Congress ought to inquire into the mischief done by the constant transferring of officers of the fifteen regiments on foreign service, which makes regimental loyalty and *esprit de corps* impossible.

Let Congress look at the marines. This branch of the navy shines whenever con-

trasted with our soldiers. There are no West Pointers among its officers and only a few graduates of Annapolis and men from the ranks. The rest were green civilians when appointed. Five-sixths of its officers have entered the marines since 1898. It is a service to be proud of. Why? Is it wholly due to its connection with the navy, or its constantly seeing foreign service and going to sea? No; its admirable efficiency, the smartness, the neatness, and excellent set-up of the men and the *esprit de corps* of its officers, cannot be so easily explained. Some one ought to tell us why, some one like a committee of Congress. Would such a committee dwell on the fact that the Marine Corps provides no quarters at permanent posts—save here and there one at navy yards—for the families of its officers, in addition to some of the other differences between these two fighting forces?

LAND DEFENCES OF OUR COASTS

Why Are They, Like the Navy, So Lightly Ignored by the Militarists?—
Their Adequacy Attested by Experts—Instance of the Dardanelles—Effectiveness of Mine Fields Shown in
Present War—Difficulties of Invasion

NEXT to the navy officers, who in every discussion of national preparedness are hushed aside with the humiliating assumption that they will inevitably be defeated in any and every fleet action, it would seem as if our coast defences and their officers were the most shabbily treated by advocates of greater national preparedness. Thus I heard the president of the National Security League the other night dismiss our costly and elaborate system of coast defences with a wave of his hand and the remark:

"You know what our coast defences are. They may be good where they are, but anybody can land and walk around them."

His audience might surely have been pardoned for asking why, in that case, the fortifications were huilt at all. It was plainly merely scratching the surface of the subject. But Mr. Menken is hardly an exception to the rule; there are plenty of others who assume at the beginning of their plea for a greater army that our coast defences are no more of value than so many match-boxes. It is, therefore, worth while setting down a few little-known facts about them.

In the first place since 1888 there has been expended upon the seacoast defences of the United States proper no less than \$126,112,068.50. There has been appropriated for all fortifications and related purposes in the United States and its insular possessions since 1888 a grand total of \$175,973,699.13—rather a large sum if honestly spent, and it has been honestly spent, to wave aside as not worth considering. But, of course, large sums of money may be unwisely invested in an inadequate plant. Let us, therefore, see what the experts, to whom the

Security League invariably turns for leadership, have to say as to the merits of the seacoast fortifications.

SOME TESTIMONY ON THE SUBJECT.

Testifying before the Sub-Committee of the House Committee on Appropriations in charge of the Fortifications Appropriation bill of 1915-1916, during February of this year, Secretary of War Garrison, in reply to a question whether in a broad sense our coast defences were adequate, replied as follows:

"Yes, sir; they certainly are adequate for the purpose for which they were placed there, qualifying only to the extent, that I do not mean to say that some guns may not be on naval ships that can shoot more effectively at extreme ranges, but when you come down to that you see how small a part that plays; those ships could not come in near the shore; they would have to lie out there and occasionally shoot, perhaps shooting on the hit-or-miss plan; and doing some damage or doing no damage."

Congressman Gardner and others having made much of this fact that the guns on the new Queen Elizabeth and other super-Dreadnoughts can outrange our coast ordnance, Secretary Garrison was asked what the War Department was doing as to this. He replied that he was asking for money to alter the mounting and elevation of the guns in the existing forts which would give them approximately the range of the guns on these new ships, and he suggested that in any new construction, guns equal or superior to any afloat should be installed. "But," he added, "there is no occasion to rush into that [the replacing of many old guns with new and larger ones], now, and to attempt to scatter 14 or 16-inch guns all

over our continent would certainly result in our getting nowhere."

WHAT REAL SOLDIERS THINK.

Now, Secretary Garrison may be objected to on the ground that he is a civilian and not a military expert. Fortunately, there were military experts also in attendance upon this Committee. One of them was Brigadier-General Erasmus M. Weaver, Chief of Coast Artillery, whose duty it is, he said, to "be advised as to the character and sufficiency of our seacoast armament." In reply to a question, Gen. Weaver said:

"My opinion is that our system of fortifications is reasonably adequate for all defensive purposes which they are likely to be called upon to meet." A little later he again said:

"I have been a close student of the whole subject, naturally, for a number of years, and I know of no fortifications in the world, as far as my reading, observation, and knowledge go, that compare favorably in efficiency with ours."

Now, to make coast defences valuable something else is needed besides guns—properly trained officers and men. As to our Coast Artillery force, Gen. Weaver said:

"I think it is at least equal to that of any coast-defence personnel in the world."

In his annual report, dated Washington, September 19, 1914, Gen. Weaver had previously had the following to say about the efficiency of his men: "The work of the personnel has been maintained at a high standard of efficiency, as is evidenced below under the heading 'Instruction' and 'Target Practice.' Attention is particularly invited to the efficiency of gun and mortar practice at

night. This is the second year that night practice has been attempted, and it is encouraging to note that the efficiency of both day and night gun and mortar, as well as mine, practice has been fully maintained. The effort has been, in both practices, to assimilate the conditions as closely as possible to those that would be met with in war."

GENERAL CROZIER'S TESTIMONY.

The greatest expert in this country on fortifications and guns, Gen. William Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, was also called by this committee. Being asked what, in his judgment, would be the condition in our fortifications after the alterations to which Secretary Garrison referred were made in the mounting and elevation of the existing guns in our forts, Gen. Crozier replied:

"I am of the opinion, Mr. Chairman, that they [our fortifications] will be of such power and will be recognized of such power *that naval officers would not put their ships up against them in a fight.* The 12-inch guns that we have mounted in our fortifications, after the alterations to which you have alluded, will have with this heaviest projectile a range of something over 17,000 yards, and I have not any belief that naval vessels, even when their guns will permit them to fire at a greater range than that, would stand off at a greater range and attempt to injure our fortifications by bombardment, because the chances of their inflicting injury would be so small that they would not consider the waste of the ammunition to be justified. Now, by another change, with the use of a lighter projectile, of 700 pounds weight, we could still further increase the range by 2,000 yards, or running up to about 19,500 yards for this old type of 12-inch gun. You have had some testimony before you to the effect that the claim had been made that after these changes these guns would be just as good as the best guns now being mounted on foreign vessels of war. Nobody that I know of has made any such claim, and I do not think anybody would claim that a modern 12-inch gun, no matter what you did with it, would be as good as a modern 15-inch gun; but in my opinion these guns, with the other advantages which land-defence fortifications have, will be adequate for maintaining a successful combat with vessels of war armed with any gun which is now under construction anywhere in the world, to my knowledge."

It would be hard to obtain a more positive statement as to what would happen if the Queen Elizabeth should appear off our coasts than this.

COAST DEFENCES STILL BELIEVED IN.

As has already been pointed out in a previous article, there has been nothing in this war to shake the faith of ordnance officers in coast defences. The German coast defences are protected by shoal waters and tremendous mine fields; navigation there is said to be so difficult that the most skilful pilot would not dare take a ship in when all beacons and lighthouses are extinguished and all the floating aids to navigation have been removed. As a result the British fleet has delivered no at-

tack whatever upon the island of Hellgoland or any other point of the land defences, thus indicating that there are other defences besides our own that naval officers will not, as Gen. Crozier said, "put their ships up against them in a fight."

In the Dardanelles we have had the Queen Elizabeth herself at work, and have witnessed her hasty flight to England just as soon as the German submarines appeared and torpedoed six of the Allies' battleships. American correspondents are among those who have testified that the guns on the British fleet did surprisingly little damage to the coast defences of the Dardanelles. A few guns were dismounted, but only one or two of the defences were, it is stated, actually put out of business. It is true that the guns of the ships made possible the landing (at a terrible cost of lives) of the Allied troops; but, once ashore, they have made little or no headway since, and, what is of greater importance in the discussion of our own defence problem, it is widely believed that as soon as the inclement weather sets in, about the 1st of December, the troops will have to abandon their positions and retreat to their ships, because in the absence of any harbor it will probably be impossible then to keep up communication with the troops. If this proves to be the case, it will be an interesting example as to what might happen to the enemy that is so blithely landed by the advocates of military preparedness on the open shores of Long Island or Atlantic City.

EFFECTIVENESS OF MINE FIELDS.

But a coast defence does not comprise only men and guns. There are other means of opposing an enemy. Of these the most important is the floating mine, which has taken such tremendous toll of ships and lives during the present war, that did such effective work during our Civil War in the rivers of the Confederacy, and, more recently, in the Russo-Japanese War. It will be remembered that when Admiral Beatty was victoriously pursuing the German battle-cruiser squadron he had to let the enemy escape with the loss of only one ship, because he found himself approaching German mine-fields and German submarines. He did not run on a mine, nor did a submarine, so far as known, attack one of his ships; none the less, he hauled off and started straight back for home, thus giving the best possible evidence of the respect that naval officers have for two methods of defending coasts.

The effectiveness of an individual mine has been many times illustrated but never better than by the sinking of the German cruiser Yorck, with a loss of three-quarters of her crew after striking one of the mines laid by Germans in their own waters. In addition to six Allied battleships submarined in the Dardanelles, two, the Ocean and the Irresistible, were sunk by floating mines, without the enemy's risking a man. After this all the battleships disappeared.

Gen. Weaver has testified that the American defence plan involves submarines, especially in Puget Sound and San

Francisco, in places where the water is so deep that mines cannot be used. One of the greatest submarine experts in the country writes me that with 200 submarines properly distributed "we should be secure from invasion." As long as there was a single American submarine afloat, any invading fleet would have a very uncomfortable time as it lay off our coast defences outside of the mine fields, with all lights out, with buoys removed and channels mined, and tried to put the fortifications out of business so that a landing could be achieved not on the open beach, but in a sheltered harbor.

Much is made by the advocates of greater preparedness of the fact, officially confirmed by Gen. Weaver in his testimony already referred to, that our coast defences are "open from behind." But so are all coast defences the world over; so they always have been since the day of the round masonry fort. This war has shown what a simple method of defence not only for the rears of coast defences but for forts, exists in the trench with barbed-wire entanglements. Gen. Kitchener's raw recruits have brought home the fact that they can hold off the German veterans in such trenches. Trenches have indeed saved the great line of French forts from Verdun to Belfort. Had the German siege artillery been able to approach near enough to these forts to hit them, they would have been smashed to pieces as rapidly as have been the Russian and Belgian fortresses that were deemed impregnable and the French forts that have succumbed.

AS TO SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION.

Finally, as to the supplies of ammunition available for coast defences, it is true that Gen. Crozier, Gen. Wotherspoon, and Gen. Weaver have testified that we have not the amount of ammunition on hand which those officers think necessary. Gen. Weaver considers that an allowance of two hours' supplies for each coast gun in the United States is sufficient, because of the possibility of transferring ammunition from one coast to another and one fort to another. Gen. Weaver testified that he had a full supply of ammunition on hand for the 10-inch and 12-inch rifles, but less than 50 per cent. in the case of the mortars. If, therefore, the advocates of preparedness wish to demand additional supplies for the larger guns and more for the mortars, they will be on sure ground and will have the hearty coöperation of these experts, particularly as the progress of events in Europe shows that far greater quantities of ammunition can be shot away in battle than any one had heretofore imagined.

Here again the question of policy comes up. If it is decided that we shall pursue the plan of defensive operations only, we can well afford, if we must have defences, to strengthen our coast defences, lay in all the mines we can possibly use, submarines in plenty, and dirigible torpedoes according to the plans of young Mr. Hammond, and any other devices that the Naval Inventions Board may work out. With a clear goal and definite problems assigned to it, the country should, with the coöperation of both services, be able to accomplish so much as to make it impossible for a foreign na-

tion to consider the question of invasion and at the same time save ourselves from the cost of a huge fleet and army.

THE QUESTION OF AN OVERSEAS RAID.

As for this question of invasion, about which such utter nonsense has been written, still one more word is in place. Representative Williams, of Illinois, has estimated that it will require 1,000 transports, each conveying 1,000 men, with provisions, munitions, and arms and equipment, convoyed by 100 battleships, if Japan should seriously make an attempt upon our shores. Thirty-one transports and sixty-two war vessels were necessary to take the Canadian expedition of 33,000 troops to England at the beginning of 1915, and the 28,000 troops from Australia required forty ships. Germany could not do better. It is well worth while to quote in this connection what Representative Witherspoon, of Mississippi, said January 29 last on the Naval Appropriation bill about Germany's twenty pre-Dreadnought battleships:

But what I want to call your attention to especially about these ships is that they ought not to be considered by us at all, for the reason that it is an impossibility for them to cross the ocean. They cannot carry coal enough to bring them across the ocean, not one of them. The maximum coal capacity of the first five of those German battleships is 1,050 tons. The maximum coal capacity of the next five is 1,400 tons. The maximum coal capacity of the next five is 1,600 tons, and of the other five is 1,800 tons of coal. You cannot get those ships across the ocean with that much coal. They can not carry enough coal to bring them, the largest of them, closer than within 500 miles of our shores, and I do not believe the smallest of them could get half-way across the ocean.

Even more striking is a statement in the brilliant book by a dissenting German, "I Accuse," in which he bitterly criticises his own Government from the beginning to the end. Speaking of a possible expedition from Germany to Great Britain, he says: "Notwithstanding all the admiration we may feel for the achievements of our heroic navy, it would be foolish to close our eyes to the fact that the gigantic superiority of the English fleet cannot be equalized by means of Zeppelins and submarines—of which latter, be it observed, England possesses a greater number than we do [in 1912 eighty-five, to which must be added ninety French]. And in all this we have to bear in mind the fact that the English fleet would be the assailant; the German fleet would be the fleet assailed, in so far as it managed to press forward to the Channel. The German fleet would, however, have to protect not only itself, but also clumsy cargo boats, incapable of self-defence, on which there would have to be transported to England a number of army corps, with the appropriate light and heavy artillery, cavalry, trains, pioneer troops, automobiles, and aircraft material. Is such an attempt at all conceivable? Is it possible that there are human beings who are prepared to expose to destruction at a blow on such a scale as this hundreds of thousands of their fellowmen?"

WHOLE EXPEDITION IN PERIL.

This mere statement of the problem would seem to show its impracticability.

As far back as February, 1909, a competent writer in the *Contemporary Review* pointed out that any fleet which

could bring German troops to England could move only at a speed of six or seven knots an hour, the speed of the slowest vessel, and that these slow-going merchant ships, "crowded with men, would form an easy target for torpedo craft or mine layers, even in small force, and the sinking of a few would probably cause panic among the remainder."

The same writer pointed out that if 150,000 Germans were to be transported on 200,000 tons of shipping it would have to be "a force destitute of artillery, cavalry, and land transport." He also proved that 200,000 tons of shipping cannot be found lying in German ports at any one time, and that to gather them together would take days and probably weeks, and give due notice of their intention of moving. That it would take such an armada about three weeks to cross the Atlantic has recently been pointed out by Mr. Jonathan A. Rawson, jr., and this allows for fair weather and smooth seas all the way.

While it is true that the United States has not the overwhelming superiority of the English fleet, that does not alter the fact that an expedition to the United States, a distance of 4,000 miles from Bremen and Hamburg—and the Germans have no nearer base from which to operate—would be an undertaking so vastly more difficult than an invasion of England, that not even the Germans would contemplate it.

Surely there is nothing in the condition of our coast defences or in this problem of overseas invasion to make us give in to the sudden fears of the militarists!

SHALL WE PAY THE MILITIA?

Militia Pay Bill a Sop to the National Guard—Arguments Against the Proposal—Enormous Expense Certain to Grow, Even if the Beginning Were Moderate—Administration Preparedness Plan a Reversal of Historic American Policy

THE Administration plan for the enlargement of the regular army by the enlistment of a special reserve force in addition to the State militia is a radical departure in our history—first, because no such reserve has ever been undertaken before and, secondly, because it means the final abandonment of the plan to make of the existing National Guard a first-line reserve in time of war. As such it has served in several of our wars, more or less—generally less—successfully. But legal experts in the War Department and others have come to the conclusion that it cannot go any further in the Federalizing of the militia than it has now gone, without coming into violent contact with the Constitution of the United States. Hence the abandonment of the militia as a first reserve and the coming transfer of the affections and interest of the War Department to the new Federal reserve, provided that Congress shall sanction it.

That this will cause heart-burnings in

the militia is obvious. That body has felt hurt because it was unofficially noised about that graduates of the publicity-achieving civilian camps of the past summer were to be regarded as in line for commissions as regular officers in war time. Militiamen, especially officers, who serve faithfully, put in much more time soldiering in one year than do those who spend a month at such a training camp. The drill is more trying and monotonous, and there is no glare of the lime-light about it.

Now, if it becomes known that the War Department will hereafter be only secondarily interested in the State troops, there is bound to be further disappointment, which cannot have a favorable effect upon enlistments, particularly in view of the fact that the new Federal Reserve will not have to drill throughout the winter, or to be in readiness for strike or riot duty, but will drill in summer time in the open. To offset this discouragement, the War Department again holds

out the Militia Pay bill, this time as a sop, whereas heretofore it has been heralded as the one necessary step to make the National Guard the complete and efficient organization it ought to be.

WHAT THE PAY BILL OFFERS.

This pay bill is now a familiar one on the calendars of Congress, but not until last winter did it receive the sanction of the President, the War Department, and of the chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, Congressman Hay, in addition to the National Militia Board, the National Guard Association, etc., or pass the House. Its object is simply to pay officers and men of the militia for all their drills in winter time; that is for service which, since the foundation of the republic, has been performed without remuneration as a patriotic free-will offering to the States and to the Union. The reason given for it is the assertion that greater efficiency and a better grade of militiamen can be secured by paying for the winter drills; that it costs men money

to belong now; that many cannot, therefore, afford to, and that more serious and valuable recruits could be obtained if the militia could offer 50 cents a drill, or \$2 a month, as compensation.

It is estimated that this bill will cost all the way from \$8,000,000 to \$15,000,000 a year. The more effective it might be, that is, the more it brought men into the ranks—if any—the higher would be the cost. It has been eagerly seized upon by certain State authorities whose slogan is: "Let Uncle Sam support the militia."

The proposal that if the militia is to be paid at all, it should be paid by the several States whose creation it is, evokes no enthusiasm whatever in the various State capitals. Hence the powerful militia lobby which has been working for the bill has wasted no time at home, but gone straight to Washington.

Even there, however, it has run upon some serious rocks. There are constitutional lawyers in plenty to point out that there is no provision in the Constitution which confers upon Congress the right to "support" or "maintain" the militia, and that the bill as drawn would make it possible for the President to strip a State of all its troops, leaving it powerless to suppress violence within its own borders or to enforce its laws, if he thinks occasion warrants his sending the entire militia elsewhere. In our recent border troubles, for instance, had this proposed law been in force, the President might have sent the entire New York militia to the Rio Grande on the ground of the "grave emergency" existing there, leaving the State bare of troops.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PROPOSAL.

The arguments against the bill—arguments advanced not merely by captious civilian critics, but by some National Guard officers like Col. W. G. Bates, of the Seventy-first New York, and regular officers, and by others who have studied the question, among them a minority of the House Committee on Military Affairs—may be summarized as follows:

- (1.) There is no guarantee whatever that the payments authorized will accomplish the desired end of increasing the *efficiency* of the militia.
- (2.) The bill will create a new class of public servants to be paid out of the Federal Treasury for all time.
- (3.) It will create another powerful military machine well organized, as its lobby shows, to bring pressure to bear upon Congress for further increases.
- (4.) It is special legislation urged by men who will profit financially by its passage.
- (5.) No reliable forecast whatever can be made of its cost, as is shown by the fact that the estimates vary by \$7,000,000; that is, they run from \$8,000,000 to \$15,000,000 a year. One Congressman believes that it will go to \$100,000,000 in a few years.
- (6.) It makes possible a grave conflict of authority between a State and the Federal Government, and is a further blow at States' Rights.
- (7.) The constitutionality of such a measure is more than dubious.

As to the first of these points, pay for the voluntary service now performed could only give us a better militia if the sole evil were non-attendance at drills

and the money paid were sufficient to lure the men in the ranks to the armories on drill nights. Nor would it be a cure-all if the trouble were the quality of the men now enlisted. No pay of fifty cents or a dollar a night could tempt the men who compose the best-drilled and most efficient regiments such as the Seventh Regiment, Squadron A, the Twenty-third Regiment, and the crack regiments everywhere. As for the others—and the writer served in the ranks of an unfashionable regiment—they contain a good cross-section of the working classes of a city, very much the same kind of men who turn out in case of hostilities.

SUM MUST BE MUCH LARGER.

Undoubtedly they would be glad to have the United States give them real money for services they now render freely, but to most of them the sum would have to be far larger than is contemplated in order to induce them to enlist if there were no other motive. If there are some regiments in which the material is inferior, then the fault is largely with the officers; poor officers attract poor recruits, and make poor regiments. Well-officed and well-disciplined regiments, in which there is a good soldierly spirit, naturally draw recruits to them. There is the gravest doubt, moreover, whether the kind of men who would be lured into the service of the State by a bait of \$2 a month, would be really worth having, as good, for instance, as the present material.

But if the whole trouble is with the officers, can better men be lured into the service by 20 per cent. per annum of the regular officer's pay? It is again doubtful, because in most States, officers are elected by the votes of the soldiers, who are all too apt to choose "good fellows," but weak disciplinarians, men rather of their own kind with whom they can be on terms of intimacy. So long as this system continues its evil workings will merely be intensified by the desire of officers in need of money, or pecuniarily ambitious, to intrigue with the men in order that they may succeed to the higher salaries of their captains or majors. The advocates of the bill ignore this point, but insist that regular pay will retain in the service "capable officers, many of whom might otherwise be compelled to resign," and enable "officers of moderate means to devote the time necessary to military duties and studies."

It is my observation that the bulk of the capable officers who resign do so because of pressure of business, that is, because of prosperity. Few officers of moderate means try to eke out their salaries by night work; hence, the drills do not interfere with securing of men of this class, and the pecuniary burden for uniforms, etc., is far less severe than is the demand for the time of an officer.

In our New York Guard troop, battery and company commanders, and some staff officers spend from three to five nights a week throughout the season at their armories. After a while the strain becomes too great or the officer's home life demands more attention. Not in one case in a hundred is the resignation due to inability to earn enough above one's living expenses to pay for the extra expense one is put to. It is the time demanded of the studious and ambitious

officer that is the real stumbling block, and if officers of leisure can be found they are usually in no need whatever of 25 per cent. of a regular lieutenant's pay.

A LESSON FROM PENSION INCREASE.

As for the question of cost and the creation of a new political military machine, the former Adjutant-General of New York State, William Verbeck, in a twenty-six page pamphlet issued by him when in office, asked the question: "Will the National Guard, if the bill is passed, demand additional compensation?" He answered it thus: "This bill provides reasonable compensation and it is not fair to presume that the National Guard will undertake to make any unreasonable demands. By so doing, they would only injure the good reputation which they have already obtained. Unreasonable demands would be met by a just rebuke from Congress."

This was just what the country heard in the early days of the pensions after the Civil War. Did anybody say that the veterans of the Grand Army wished a pension for everybody? How scandalous to insinuate it, or to say that in a few years Government pap would be asked for skulkers, cowards, and camp-followers, or that more than a few millions would be! Yet we know what has happened in the last fifty years.

The minority of the House Military Affairs Committee on December 10, 1912, thus expressed itself as to the dangers that lurk behind this legislation:

The minority making this report is convinced that the legislation proposed by the pending bill is not only unwise, but that it is dangerous in the extreme. Rather than enter upon a legislative course that will inevitably entail upon the general Government an enormous expense, which may be found in dire emergency to have been wasted, a course that will surely lead to the creation of a great military force that will become so powerful politically that Congress will be no more able to resist its demands than it has been to resist the demands of the far less compactly organized and manageable army of pension applicants and their friends, this minority would favor a reasonable increase of the regular army, leaving the States to maintain their own troops in their own way, and at their own expense, without any aid whatever from the United States. Objectionable as such an increase of the regular army would be, it would have the merit of assuring us the possession of an armed force that in time of war would, by its persistent training, be worth all of its cost, which undoubtedly would be cheaper in the end than the cost of the great semi-military, semi-civil organization, wielding tremendous political power, that will grow up as surely as the sun will rise and set if the course of legislation outlined by the pending bill is once entered upon.

CERTAINTY OF PROGRESSIVE DEMANDS.

Congressman Fitzgerald, of New York, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the last House, in speaking against the bill in Congress, after pointing out that the Federal Government is already paying out \$4,000,000 annually for the equipment of the militia, said: "When men are put upon a basis where they receive 25 per cent. of the pay of an enlisted man, they will very quickly demand the compensation be increased to 50, to 75, and then to 100 per cent. of the pay of an enlisted man; and then, with this organized movement extending into every little hamlet throughout the country will

come an irresistible demand that the pay of the enlisted men of the army be increased so that the militia may be the beneficiaries, and instead of imposing an annual charge of six or eight million dollars, as some well-informed persons predict, it will very easily result in a fixed charge of over thirty million a year . . . but now it is proposed that we change our policy, and, instead of relying upon patriotic motives that we rely

upon selfishness and greed, and entirely upon a financial inducement for men to undertake service in the militia."

What the militia needs, if it is to be developed, is not pay, but popular encouragement, further advances along the lines of the last few years, during which it has made very great strides, notably in the East; the abolition of the election of officers; the freeing of its business methods from much of the regular army

red tape, which often causes waste, and above all, its removal from the sphere of politics. It is politics and the lack of real military standards that have been the bane of the militia service. Of course, it is true that it needs greater efficiency, but it is getting this in a remarkable degree in these days—and wholly without the Militia Pay bill.

WHY CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE NAVY?

Inherent in Our Theory of Government that Professional Soldiers and Sailors Shall Be Under Civil Authority—Blunders and Pride of Expert Opinion in the Navy's Past—Civilians Should Control Both Purse-Strings and Military Policy

WHY does the Navy need civilian control? Why should we not turn over the Navy Department, the navy itself, and everything relating to the service afloat to naval officers, making some Rear-Admiral the Secretary of the Navy, with a seat in the Cabinet? They do it in France and Germany and elsewhere. Why not turn over the whole business of the navy to the experts?

Primarily because it is contrary to the accepted Anglo-Saxon tradition, which has ever guarded most jealously the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Our forefathers had been dominated by the military throughout their Colonial days; they were in no mood to exalt it after they had achieved their independence. They saw that even in the mother-country the control of the navy and army was kept in civilian hands, and they stuck to the principle not only in the administration of the Government, but in the safeguarding of the rights of the civilian individual from any interference by courts-martial—an echo of which we have just had in this State in the debate over the proposed Constitution. It is true that Washington appointed his old Chief of Artillery, Henry Knox, as the first Secretary of War, and it is a fact also that there is no law prohibiting the appointment as Secretary of War of a General on the active list or an active Admiral as the Secretary of the Navy. Generals Sherman and Schofield were two generals who acted as Secretary of War for considerable periods while also on the army's active list. Former officers in number have served as Secretary of War; fewer as Secretary of the Navy. But the principle that there should be complete civilian control has none the less been upheld by public sentiment and by tradition.

Indeed, President Wilson well stated the reason for it in his speech in New York on May 17, in which he defined the sphere of activity of our naval officers thus:

"The mission of America is the only thing that a sailor or a soldier should think about. *He has nothing to do with the formulation of her policy.* He is to support her policy, whatever it is, but he is to support her policy in the spirit

of herself. And the strength of our policy is that we, who for the time being administer the affairs of this nation, do not originate her spirit. We attempt to embody it. We attempt to realize it in action. We are dominated by it. We do not dictate it."

The reason for this is that the expert, however patriotic and highminded, cannot but look at things from a rather narrow and partisan professional point of view. When one thinks of the courtly and gentle Dewey, of Farragut, of C. R. P. Rodgers, and a host of other naval celebrities, to say nothing of the leaders of our present generation of naval officers, it is impossible to conjure up an American von Tirpitz, and yet it is true that there have been some men in high positions who seemed bent on subordinating everything to their own and the navy's aggrandizement. But even if this is exceptional, it is difficult for the men at the top in either the army or the navy to view things from the standpoint of the country as a whole. They have long been detached from civilian life, with the business side of which they may never have come into contact. Theirs is not the responsibility for raising funds, that is, for providing the ways and means for purchasing the armaments they desire. Their entire training leads them, moreover, to *fear* the oncoming of an enemy, and they habitually think of every possible combination that may be brought against them.

THE SOLDIER IS ALWAYS FEARFUL.

Hence, as already pointed out in these articles, no naval or military officer is ever satisfied with the forces at his disposal—at least, there is no record of such a one. The German General Staff was not—even after their levy upon the people of Germany in 1913, when they took a portion, not of the citizen's income, but of his property, in order to *defend* Germany against its menacing foes. No French or British general ever had enough men, and so it goes. Now, we are as a nation very certain, from the President down, that none of our officers of the army or navy will ever get into this frame of mind. Do we not all of us know Smith, Brown, and Jones, of the navy, and Robinson, Allen, and Tucker,

of the army? Are they not peace-loving? Is there anything of the militarist about them? Well, the answer is that there is not individually, but that they are parts of a system and a machine which inevitably make for the subordination of everything civilian to the military. What other lessons can be drawn from the present experience of the world?

Is it not true that there have been French militarists, from the Louis down, as menacing to the world's peace as any made in Germany? True, under the Republic they have been held in check, but the Republic produced a Boulanger, and the Dreyfus trial, with its sickening revelations, also took place under it. Have we not even seen signs in one of the youngest of the great nations of the world, Japan, that its internal order was threatened by militaristic influences? Did not a Cabinet fall on the question of a naval increase or the refusal thereof? Were there not shocking stories of naval corruption from there a year ago, which proved to have been linked up with corruption in Berlin by agents of the German armament firms? "Since the war with China in 1894 brought in an era of huge contracts for supplies," says Robert Young, editor of the *Japan Chronicle*, "corruption in places high and low, in the army as well as the navy, has been a constant theme of the Japanese newspapers. . . . But the most fertile source of demoralization has been the temptation offered by huge contracts for armament material and the competition of rival firms." Rear-Admiral Fujill was arrested in 1914 for taking bribes aggregating \$176,350.

Have we not got our own Navy League, headed by a former navy officer, which has just solemnly declared as its programme that we shall have not only the largest navy in the world, but one competent to meet and overcome the fleets of any three Powers that may be brought against us—say, Germany, England, and France? This is surely out-Bernharding Bernhard! Yet this is solemnly urged by a rich and prosperous body of American citizens. If their policy were carried out, and there were a similar annual expansion of our land forces, is it too much to say that the business of preparing for

war would take precedence over every other department of Government, whether concerned with education, or the development or conservation of resources, of water powers and waste lands, etc., etc.? Were that policy to be accepted by the American people, this country would become as much dreaded for its navallism as England has been, and it would be a standing menace to the peace of the world, however certain President Wilson and others may be that this country at this day and hour is not contemplating aggression, and never could think of aggression.

PERIL IS IN THE SYSTEM.

No, it is not the individual in the military and naval system that is to be inveighed against, but the system itself in which the individual is but a cog. The individual is swept along by the tide; he cannot help himself, and that tendency is best checked under free Governments by civilian control. More than that, is it not true, that in every walk of life the expert must needs be controlled, lest his absorption in his specialty make him subordinate everything to the development of that specialty? We have seen some curious evidences of this in the medical profession. Have we not had plenty of signs right here in New York city of the trend of certain medical men towards assuming autocratic control of the public? Do they not desire to vaccinate us by law, not once, but a number of times at once; do they not wish to pass laws demanding a rigid physical inspection of every individual at least once a year? Do we not find a conservatism as hostile to any departure from the old traditions as any one could find in the army or navy? Do we not find insanity experts who think that every individual varies mentally from the normal, and experts in other sad diseases who insist that 60 to 70 per cent. of the entire world is affected by them? Do we not find lawyers in plenty who look upon every problem that is presented from the point of view of the courts and the machinery of the law? The tendency of the expert to become absolutely absorbed in his subject is surely too obvious to need dwelling upon, and particularly when authorities confer upon him complete power, do we get excesses which serve to alarm the public.

But there is still another and a very particular reason why the control of the navy and army should not be completely handed over to experts. It is that the public does not get the best results when the experts are solely in charge. As to that, there could be nothing more illuminating than the history of the United States navy itself, in which is to be found instance after instance where professional conservatism and the pride of opinion of experts have combined to keep the service in a narrow rut and routine, and, therefore, prevented the adoption and development of new types of vessels and engines of war. It is easy to pick out a few historical instances.

CASE OF THE FIRST DREADNOUGHT.

For example, the first Dreadnought ever built was constructed, not in England, a dozen years ago, but in the United States in 1814. True, she was a

wooden Dreadnought, but she was an all-big-gun vessel, and her vital parts were surrounded by an armor of oak exactly comparable to the armor of the battleship of to-day. This was the Demologos, or Fulton, built under the direction of Robert Fulton himself, and it was the first war steamship ever built. Besides having a wheel in centre, and the radical innovation of steam, her batteries of twenty long 32-pounders were reinforced by a submarine gun carrying a 100-pound shot. She measured 145 feet over all, and was built with two hulls separated from end to end by a channel 15 feet wide and 66 feet long, in which the waterwheel revolved absolutely protected from the enemy's shot. The main, or gun, deck, was protected by a parapet 4 feet 10 inches thick of solid timber, and on the upper deck many hundreds of men could have paraded. She had two stout masts and four rudders, so that she might go either way without turning. In addition, she had a furnace for hot shot, and could discharge an immense column of boiling water into an enemy's port-hole. She could have steamed through the British fleet from end to end unscathed, but, the war coming to an end, she was tied up in the Brooklyn navy yard, and there she lay for fifteen years, until she blew up. The navy made no attempt to improve upon her or to make use of Fulton's ideas, or to lead the world in producing war steamships. It was actually not until 1841 that two twin side-wheelers, the Mississippi and the Missouri, were finally built by the navy as its first steam cruisers, by which time war steamships were almost a commonplace abroad. Even as late as 1835, the famous Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry nearly threw away his reputation when he asserted that a war steamship of 1,300 tons would be built to cruise the sea for twenty days at a time without accident.

The history of the Monitor affords still another bit of evidence. What difficulties Ericsson had in overcoming the conservatism of the Navy Department has been well pointed out in the admirable life of the inventor written by Col. William C. Church, the veteran editor of the *Army and Navy Journal*. Yet the Monitor, hastily built as it was, played a great rôle in revolutionizing warfare. The cause of its failure to become a dominating naval type was the lack of a proper ventilation system, the lack of any decks on which to parade the crew when at sea, and because the navy could not get used to the fact that water rolled over the deck while the Monitor was at sea. As soon as the war was over, the newest and best of the ships, the Dunderberg, etc., were sold to foreign governments. True, the Miantonomoh and the Monadnock cruised successfully, the one to Europe and the other around Cape Horn, but the navy stuck to the high-sided wooden ships until the new navy came, when it squarely turned its back upon this American invention and followed the British precedent in building the high-sided predecessors of the present battleships. These took, it is true, the principle of Ericsson's turret and armor, but abandoned some of the vital features which distinguished the Monitor. Curiously enough, to-day, in November, 1915, we have the British Prime Minis-

ter Asquith, lauding in the House of Commons, the service of the British Monitors as having been the most distinguished of any vessels since the war began, and praising Lord Fisher for his development and use of these boats which more nearly approach, if the fragmentary descriptions which arrive here are correct, the Ericsson Monitors than anything built since, with the exception of the two or three that the American Navy has constructed in modern times, only to abandon.

SO WITH TORPEDO BOATS AND SUBMARINES.

The history of the torpedo boat is the third illustration of the inability of our naval officers to become enthusiastic about new types of craft. The Confederates in the Hunley and David produced boats that brought us right up to the era of modern submarines. Cushing's torpedoing of the *Albermarle*, and the Confederate use of the torpedo and the near-submarine, were, despite the lapse of years, the step just preceding modern mine and torpedo developments. But the navy pressed not at all for the development of the torpedo boat until about 1890. It had in the seventies a torpedo ram, the *Alarm*, which like the *Demologos* was allowed to rust out in a navy yard. Its officers concerned themselves not at all with the study of the development of the floating mine, and for this the whole responsibility cannot be put upon the civilian Secretaries, for there were navy officers at the head of every bureau of the Department during these years. They could easily have slipped into the appropriation bills a few thousands for experimental torpedo boats, but they did not even protest very vigorously against the building in the late seventies of the *Trenton* and the *Adams* and other comfortable wooden ships of the old type that had been the rage before the outbreak of the Civil War, although in the seventies all of the rest of the world was going in for other kinds of vessels, and the modern mobile torpedo and torpedo boat were being developed soon after.

Even after the beginning of our modern navy, our officers were but little interested, Rear-Admiral C. McR. Winslow being one of the few to take a deep interest in this new type of torpedo vessel at the outset.

And so the story has been with the submarine, too. The first group of under-water boats was tied up in the navy yards! Only gradually was practice with them begun. Not until Secretary Daniels appointed Capt. A. W. Grunt, of the navy, last May, to take charge of the submarine, was a separate organization for them deemed worth while. Indeed, the makers of these boats charge emphatically that a great deal of the trouble which has happened on these most delicate craft has been due to the fact that very young and inexperienced officers—ensigns, the ink on whose commissions was hardly dry—have been given charge, while officers of great skill and experience were demanded. All this is being remedied under Secretary Daniels's guidance, but the fact remains that the submarine was a step-child of the navy from the time that it appeared until the war abroad showed what others could do with it, and yet it was an American

invention and the outgrowth of Confederate ingenuity and skill, as it had been, further back, the invention of Bushnell and Fulton. Indeed, the submarine has been but like numerous other American inventions which have had to find a market abroad because the designers could not interest the home authorities.

Surely, therefore, Secretary Daniels has done a great service in appointing a civilian board to cooperate with the navy, thereby not only bringing into touch with the service great talents, but creating a machinery that will examine and test all inventions offered and invite others, without professional prejudice, and put squarely alongside of the best navy talent a fresh civilian point of view untrammelled by red tape, precedent, routine, or traditions or customs. These are all practical reasons for the civilian control of the navy.

LESSONS OF THE PRESENT WAR.

Perhaps this new arrangement may lead to a reconsideration of our entire naval policy in the light of the European war. At present Secretary Daniels is asking for a little bit more of everything old and something new in the battleship cruiser, which in the opinion of many people has not yet demonstrated its worth. Nor has anybody yet really

gauged the extent of the success of the German submarines, which at this writing are sinking merchantmen in the very narrows of Gibraltar right under the eyes of the fortress and in a passage-way so narrow that it would seem as if they could be guarded against there better than anywhere else, and the mystery of how they can operate hundreds or thousands of miles from a known base remains unexplained. We have not stopped to decide whether the battleship is on top or the submarine.

Least of all, as was pointed out in the first article of this series, have we really decided whether ours is to be an offensive or a defensive navy.

But after all, the prime reason for the civilian domination of the policy and management of the navy is that this Government is not warlike, that it places the arts and ideals of peace above those of war, and even above preparation for war. Those in control, therefore, must be men who are detached from any one interest, military or civilian, so that they may survey the whole field of the nation's development and ambitions, and proportionately divide the finances of the country between the various contending branches of Government. Moreover, the people in control must be those who are

also charged with the responsibility for raising the funds. This suggests one of the dangers and weaknesses of the military programme in any country, for the officers of the General Staff can never be got to take any cognizance of the financial resources and needs of the Government; they not only demand the lion's share of the taxes wrung from a people, but they are absolutely indifferent to the starving of any other branch of governmental enterprises. We shall hear much, if the Wilson programme of preparedness goes through, about the next step, the formation of a committee of national defence to coordinate the functions of the army and the navy, and of all the civilian enterprises which it is now recognized must also be mobilized when war comes. If that committee is not supervised and controlled vigorously by Congress it will become a veritable Frankenstein monster, using all its influences to have the Government of the United States not only pour forth the bulk of its income for preparedness (the Japanese now pay one-third of their income in direct and indirect taxation), but to make preparation for war the chief business of this nation, as it has long been of France, Germany, Austria, and other countries.

THE REAL REFORM AND THE REAL PROBLEM

Never Was There Less Need for Haste in Military Measures—The Question
One of Morale Rather than Enlargement—Present System Cannot Reform Itself—Warnings from Europe's Situation

IF THE ARGUMENTS and facts advanced in this series of articles are of any value, it must be plain that any haste in building up either army or navy will not result in real preparedness. To add to the navy before the lessons of the war are gleaned, may easily mean to squander millions in an inexcusably fatuous fashion. This is so self-evident that, across the water, the British astonishment at Mr. Wilson's programme has been thus voiced by the *London Telegraph*:

"We have the spectacle of the greatest democracy in the world, although separated from Europe by more than 3,000 miles, in such a hurry for more men of war that it has decided not even to wait for the lessons on construction and armament which the war may teach. Moreover, this decision has been reached by a party which came into power in opposition to the Rooseveltian policy of the 'big stick' and pledged itself to economy in armaments."

Similarly to build upon the present unsatisfactory and criminally wasteful military system will not result either in greater efficiency or better preparedness, with the exception of the matter of additional *matériel*—new fortifications and reserves of ammunition. All of which makes haste in arming absolutely inadvisable. Even if there were occasion for hurrying, an overhauling of our present army would seem the only wise policy.

NEVER LESS NEED FOR HASTE.

As a matter of fact, there never could be a time when there was less need of haste in arming. Every month that passes with the war in full blast increases the safety of the United States by further exhausting the combatants abroad. The President and Mr. Garrison themselves admit this, not only because they adduce no positive reasons which would warrant our preparing as if the foe were at the door, but because Mr. Wilson wishes to spread his naval programme over a period of five years, and Mr. Garrison desires Congress to take two years for the increase of the regular army. Would they delay thus if they felt that there were a grave crisis at hand? As a matter of fact, Mr. Wilson, barring political reasons, could perfectly well have repeated at the Manhattan Club the appeal of his message of a year ago—that the country keep calm and beware of changing the United States into an armed camp.

That men as sensible as President Wilson and Mr. Garrison have yielded to the latest argument of the militarists that at the close of the war we shall become the objective of robber-raids by Germany and Great Britain, because we shall be the only really prosperous nation, with large supplies of cash, is not to be believed. Munchausen never invented a more absurd fairy-tale. But if they did believe it, and were to convince Congress that something must be done,

there is surely still time for a constructive procedure like the following. First, a decision as to what the policy of the United States shall be, whether defensive or offensive, and whether the country is to defend itself by its navy or primarily by its coast defences and mobile soldiery. How important this is appears from a letter I have just received from a high authority in the War Department, who states that every consideration of possible invasion presupposes the total loss of the command of the seas. That is, I take it, that every American submarine must disappear beneath the waves before our secondary defence on land will ever come into play, for it is impossible to conceive of an armada of a thousand ships crossing to our shores while there are still ten American submarines afloat. The British success in moving troops across the Channel, a two hours' run, affords no basis for comparison.

Secondly, Congress should inform the country specifically *against what possible foes* we are arming: There can only be three—Germany, Japan, and England. With France, Russia, or Italy the prospect of any hostilities is so absolutely remote as to be inconceivable; but if war did come, it could only be a question of naval combats. If there are only three probable enemies, the problem becomes at once greatly simplified, even from the point of view of the wildest military man, and we shall put an end to much loose talk about a possible European combination against us in the manner of the rob-

ber-garrisons of the Rhine in the Middle Ages.

A QUESTION OF MORALE.

Thirdly, Congress should itself show a realization of the fact that military values are not to be measured in terms of the size of fleets nor armies by their numbers. Morale, discipline, efficiency in shooting, and ability in high command are all determining factors. Examples of this are unending. Of what value to Russia was her fleet in the war with Japan, when her ships fired on each other at the Dogger Bank, and were so utterly unfit to combat the Japanese in the deciding naval battle? In the present war the Austrian army, for all its large numbers, was defeated by Servians and Russians until German efficiency took charge and competent German generals began to lead. Russia always has troops in great masses, yet in her whole modern history has never won in a conflict in which conditions were fairly equal, defeating the Turks in 1877 only because of Rumanian aid. What guarantee can Congress give to the country that the new Continental army Mr. Garrison asks will have any effective military value whatever? If Congress does realize that the question of efficiency is far more vital than that of mere numbers, it should begin its work by investigating the army from a purely military standpoint, unmuzzling every officer who appears before it, and giving him a guarantee that no criticisms of the service as it exists today will affect his future career. It would be impossible to exaggerate the startling character of the information that would come to it, from the younger officers in particular. It would demonstrate beyond question the existence of evils, which, however consecrated by years of growth and tolerance, are absolutely inconsistent with any efficient military service and work grave hardships to deserving and ambitious officers.

Such an inquiry would, of course, be compelled, if frank and honest, to place a large share of the blame upon politicians in and out of Congress. It would establish that there are economies to be effected, beginning with the present annual waste of \$5,500,000 upon "political forts" which would not only result in increased efficiency but make possible a considerable enlargement of the army without additional cost. The most desirable outcome might even be the teaching of Congress how to make military appropriations so that it will not be induced to appropriate \$17,700 in extra pay for officers engaged in the hazardous work of teaching cadets at West Point or to pay \$1,500 every year for wooden floors for the tents of these cadets when they go into "camp"—youngsters who are to train men in real camps in the field living in electrically lighted tents with permanent iron frames and board floors! Such a committee of Congress, if really searching in its inquiry, would be particularly amazed at the army of civilians attached to our garrisons, while if they should put a stop to the free use of soldiers as "strikers," as gardeners, as drivers of ice-wagons, as servants and laborers of every kind and description, they would make the army vastly more attractive to worthy Americans.

Such a committee would speedily learn,

among many other facts, (1) that general army appropriations lead to abuses and waste; that the exercise of discretion in expenditures in army posts and elsewhere leads to the precedence of the comfort of officers and their families over what would be of benefit to the public service; (2) that the lack of any actual supervision of the disposition of moneys appropriated or results obtained leads directly to inefficiency; (3) that reform from within is almost hopeless as long as there is no critical supervision from the outside, inspections by officers having less and less value; that there should be inspection by those free from army influences, precisely as we call in bank examiners to pass upon the condition of our banks—without any one feeling that that is a reflection upon the upright bankers; (4) that many of the army's faults are due to the carrying over into the military service, as reorganized in 1898, of customs like the building of homes for officers' families, which were not faults under the conditions controlling when the army was on the frontier and engaged in Indian campaigns; (5) that there is no better evidence of the necessity of a complete overhauling of the service than the so-called "Manchu" law passed by Congress itself in 1912, in order to put an end to favoritism and to absence on easy detached duty of many officers for long periods of years. This law requires that after four years of absence from his organization, an officer must be returned to his corps or else his pay will be taken out of the pay of the officer on whose order a violation took place. This law is a military monstrosity in that it is a direct interference of the Federal legislature with the management and disposition of the army's personnel. Yet the army welcomed it and believes that it adds not only to the officer's chance of getting a square deal, but to the efficiency of the service as well. None the less it stands as a grave indictment of the past yielding of the War Department to social and political pressure and of the military chiefs who permitted these grave abuses to go on and took part in them.

Once these facts were ascertained, Congress would have no difficulty in building up anew. The efficiency of the Ordnance Corps, and the Engineers along certain lines, the growing efficiency and ability of the Coast Artillery—which has made wonderful strides since the writer of this was drilled by officers of the old foot artillery in the days when an enlisted man in that branch might serve five years and never see a shotted gun fired—point the way. Congress could then strive for real preparedness by seeing to it that military neglect, indifference, and inefficiency are punished, and merit, zeal, and industry rewarded; that the political type of general forever disappears, and really capable generals be chosen who shall be kept so busy at their tasks that they shall not have the time to command divisions and departments and also make speeches all over the country in favor of more troops, more guns, and more reserves, with never a word as to the abuses that honey-comb the service. If Congress makes these changes it will put the army in a position where it can reform itself and it will find plenty of officers to respond and

to take the lead for efficiency. For, as has previously been pointed out, we have many capable officers—as we have many shirkers and blatant self-advertisers—and the best soldier-material in the world since it is the most upstanding, self-reliant, adaptable, and intelligent.

MERE MONEY WILL NOT DO IT.

Unless this reorganization takes place Congress will have voted more men, yet have little more of any army and perhaps less efficiency, than at present. Certainly no one knows whether Mr. Garrison's proposed Continental army will have any military value whatsoever—which would suggest that before the raising of 400,000 men be attempted the experiment be essayed with say 40,000 to see if it is practical and whether Americans can be had for that sort of service.

But when all the details are discussed and when all the matters of military policy have been settled one way or the other, the great question still remains: *Should the United States, in the fevered disquiet of a world-crisis, alter the policy of its national life, and go in for large armaments?* It cannot be successfully averred that what Mr. Wilson proposes is merely an enlargement of the old policy. As Mr. Bryan has correctly pointed out, it is a complete break—certainly so far as the army is concerned, in that thus far the army has been regarded as a national police and not as a body to prepare for invasion or war abroad. For more than a century the country has been unarmed and has never had a foreign war save of its own seeking. Even in the days when it was weakest, no one assailed it. Only since the days when we began to have a large navy have the rumors of war and the talk and gossip of war been abroad in the land to unsettle the public and to form the basis of militaristic appeals to Americans slavishly to imitate the military follies of the old world, to join the international alliance of the militarists who everywhere coin money out of the fears of the professional soldiers and keep the masses of the people in subjection by means of their armed fellows who are primarily instructed that they must kill their own relatives if the sovereign orders it.

What has been the pride of America—that we were free from a large professional soldiery, that the military and naval votes of our Congress could not, until recently at least, be used as the basis for increasing the burdens of militarism abroad and clamping still heavier loads upon the hard working peasantry, who, in the end, carry the soldiers on their backs—all this is now to be put aside without deliberation, without even the assurance that if the sacrifice is made the end sought will be achieved, and without, of course, waiting to put the issue squarely before the whole people a year hence. Is it any wonder that the President's words had but a half-hearted ring, or that foreign observers consider us the most volatile of people?

LIGHT-HEARTED DRAUGHT OF POISON.

It is, of course, partly due to the supreme self-confidence we have in ourselves, for which we are often criticised.

Those who with clean hands urge that we take far-reaching steps towards navalism and militarism believe, light-heartedly, that there is such a thing as a reasonable preparedness which would satisfy our generals and admirals. They, witnessing Germany's spiritual, moral, and now economic undoing through the poison of militarism, believe that we, too, can use the hypodermic syringe and escape the habit, indulge mildly in the drug, and profit only by its virtues, avoiding all its evil effects. That no one else has escaped the poison—not even democratic France—seems to count not at all in this hour, though every generation of Americans has thought differently until this day.

We are sure that with great armament works springing up about us like mushrooms over night, we shall escape

the armament scandals of Europe, those due to international concerns like the Harvey United Steel Company, composed of British, German, American, French, and Italian companies, all of them engaged in booming the market for armor plates in their respective countries on the plea that each country needed to defend itself against the others; or the scandal of the Krupps, whose cannon and ammunition are now being used against Germany and the Germans that made them. But we, being satisfied with our experiences with the patriotic unselfishness of our trusts and our protected manufacturers, take no fear from the enormous transformation of peaceful American industries into those that make the supplies of war—we are beyond price and beyond temptation! We listen gravely to the assurances that we must

increase our "national insurance" bill—now seventy-four cents on every dollar—as the only means to national safety, and forget that never have such large sums been spent in the way of national "insurance" as since 1900, and that never in any similar fifteen years in the world's history have there been so many or so terrible wars. We do not stop to ask whether a different kind of insurance is not needed; whether anybody else could be so utterly and hopelessly discredited as the militarists who raise this false cry have been by the events abroad.

Surely the way to true national preparedness for the genuine tasks of humanity, for the elevation of mankind, for the carrying on of the ideals of the great and unarmed American democracy of which we are so proud, lies elsewhere, along totally different lines!



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
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